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BEN HOVLAND*
Comments
Championed by Progressives and
William U’Ren:  Can Oregon
Give the Ballot Initiative
to the People Again?
How would you like to live in a state where the people can and
do enact laws for the common good which their Legislature
has failed to enact for them, where they can nullify any obnox-
ious measure passed by the Legislature, where they can nomi-
nate and elect, or defeat for public office, any man regardless
of his party strength, and can recall any public officer, Su-
preme Judge included, whose acts they do not approve; a state
where the party boss has been put out of business; a state in
short where the people rule . . . ?  Such a state is Oregon.
How would you like to live in a state where the people can
and do amend their constitution in the most radical fashion by
a minority vote, where one-third of the voters decides the fate
of laws affecting the other two-thirds, where one-twentieth of
the voters can and do cripple the state educational institutions
by holding up their funds; where special interests hire citizens
to circulate petitions asking for the recall of judges who have
found them guilty; where men representing themselves as for
the people, buy signatures with drinks, forge dead men’s
names, practice blackmail by buying and selling . . . signatures
for petitions needed to refer certain measures to the people; a
state where the demagogue thrives and the energetic crank
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2007.  Special thanks are
due to Professor Keith Aoki for his helpful comments and guidance.  Also thanks
are due to Executive Editor Chad Spraker and Managing Editor Ivan Jen for their
efforts.  Thanks also to Laura Althouse, Evan Smith, Les Swanson, and Amy Zubko
for their comments and encouragement.
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with money through the Initiative and the Referendum, can
legislate to his heart’s content . . . ?  Oregon is such a state.
—Allen H. Eaton1
Oregon’s initiative system is often described with adjectiveslike revered, beloved, populist, or historic.2 This system is
referred to as the voice of “the people.”3  Through the initiative
process, concerned but frustrated Oregonians may bypass an un-
responsive legislature to enact the laws important to them.4  At
least that was the intention of the leaders who gave Oregon the
initiative and referendum system.5  In the 1980s and 1990s, how-
ever, short-sighted court decisions struck down prohibitions on
payment for signature gathering.6  These court decisions “al-
lowed well-financed private interest groups to co-opt the ‘peo-
ple’s’ initiative.”7  Proponents of the current initiative regime
often rely on the claim that “the initiative process belongs to the
people”; however, this rhetoric is simply an attempt to deter in-
quiries about the realities of direct democracy and the signature-
gathering process.8
In extending the reasoning that money equals speech from po-
litical candidate campaigns9 to initiative campaigns,10 the United
States Supreme Court failed to recognize that “[t]he primary pur-
pose of signature requirements is to ensure that initiatives that
reach the ballot meet a minimum threshold of public support.”11
Professor Daniel Lowenstein and practitioner Robert Stern ar-
gue that signature gathering is not ever a matter of First Amend-
ment protected speech, but rather a tool that allows the states to
“ration spaces on the ballot in a manner consistent with the pur-
poses of the initiative process, or, indeed, in a manner that makes
any sense at all.”12
1 ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM:  THE STORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION
IN OREGON v-vi (1912).
2 Russell Sadler, A Parallel Government , 61 OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2000, at 78, 78.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See infra  text accompanying notes 26-35.
6 Sadler, supra note 2, at 78.
7 Id.
8 See  Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process:  How Demo-
cratic Is It? , 64 MONT. L. REV. 35, 44 (2003).
9 See discussion infra  Part II.A.
10 See discussion infra  Part II.B-C.
11 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 44.
12 Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Robert M. Stern, The First Amendment and Paid
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While each state’s signature threshold varies, every state with
the initiative has a signature requirement.13  As Professor Rich-
ard Ellis said, “Without a signature requirement, voters would
almost certainly be inundated with a flood of frivolous or idio-
syncratic measures.  Every irate citizen with a pet peeve and a
little energy could force their obsession upon the voters.”14
However, because of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area, the
current initiative system allows any irate citizen with a pet peeve
and a large bank account to get on the ballot and dictate part of
the electoral menu.15  In essence, by commandeering the initia-
tive system, those who can purchase ballot space are able to cir-
cumvent “the traditional checks and balances of representative
government.”16
The time has come for reform.  The costs to Oregon exceed the
value of the initiative system.  Many opponents of the current
initiative system would like to see it scrapped completely.  That is
unlikely.  Many Oregonians take a special, if not idiosyncratic
and irrational, pride in the initiative system.17  One would, how-
ever, be hard-pressed to deny that the system has become over-
used and even abused.18  For Oregonians, the initiative system
would not, and perhaps should not, be given up easily.  This
Comment argues, however, that Oregonians have already given
up the initiative system to well-financed special interests.  The
time has come to take the initiative system back.  The time has
Initiative Petition Circulators:  A Dissenting View and a Proposal , 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 175, 205 (1989).
13 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 44.
14 Id.
15 In 2002, Loren Parks, an eccentric and reclusive millionaire, single-handedly
secured a place on the ballot for two initiatives (Measures 21 and 22) that would
have transformed the way judges were elected. Id.  at 67.  Parks spent $256,453 to
qualify the two constitutional initiatives, which represented 99.7% of the financial
contributions raised by the campaigns. Id. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s reason-
ing, wealthy individuals like Parks can “purchase a place on the ballot with the same
impunity that they might acquire a yacht or a vacation home.” Id.  at 86.  States may
regulate the payment of signature gatherers only if such individuals were “foolish
enough to attempt to purchase their place on the ballot through fraudulent means.”
Id .
16 Sadler, supra  note 2, at 78.
17 See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED:  INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND
THE POWER OF MONEY 214 (2000) (noting that despite a 1995 survey that found a
large majority of Oregonians willing to accept tougher controls on the initiative sys-
tem, a majority were not willing to let the legislature decide what issues would be on
the ballot).
18 See Hans A. Linde, Taking Oregon’s Initiative Toward a New Century , 34 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 391, 399 (1998).
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come to enact reforms giving the voice of the initiative back to
the “people” who were intended to have it.19
This Comment examines the initiative system’s origins in Ore-
gon and follows its progression over the past century.  This exam-
ination reveals the intent of the founders of the initiative system
and exposes the corruption of the original vision that has taken
place since.  This Comment then examines methods available to
reform the initiative system under the current court-imposed lim-
itations and ultimately suggests that genuine reform may require
revisiting the U.S. Supreme Court case Meyer v. Grant  or a dras-
tic change in the initiative qualification process.
I
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN OREGON
A culture of corruption consumed Oregon politics in the late
nineteenth century.20  The state legislature was made up of
“briefless lawyers, farmless farmers, business failures, bar-room
loafers, Fourth-of-July orators, [and] political thugs”21 who were
more concerned with selling legislation to the highest bidder than
addressing the concerns of their constituents.22  Stories of fraud,
bribery, abuse of power, and misuse of money were common.23
As one contemporary observer noted, “[f]raud and force and
cunning were for so many years features of Oregon politics that
they came to be accepted, not only as a part of the game, but by
many as the attractive features of the game.”24  This atmosphere
created widespread dissatisfaction and distrust of the govern-
ment, which led to Oregon’s direct legislation movement.25
19 William S. U’Ren said, “The one important thing was to restore the lawmaking
power where it belonged—in the hands of the people.”  Glen Staszewski, Rejecting
the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democ-
racy , 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 413-14 (2003).  As such, the platform of the Populist
Party in 1892 proclaimed that the goal of direct democracy was “to restore the gov-
ernment of the Republic to the hands of the ‘plain people,’ with which class it
originated.” Id.  at 414.
20 David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy:  William
Simon U’Ren and “The Oregon System,”  67 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 948-49 (1994).
21 Id.  at 949 (alteration in original) (quoting EATON, supra  note 1, at 3).
22 See id.
23 EATON, supra  note 1, at 3.
24 Id.
25 BOB GRUNDSTAD, LEGISLATIVE ADMIN. COMM., THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON AND OTHER STATES 4
(1978); see  Schuman, supra  note 20, at 949.
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A. The Progressive Movement and William U’Ren
Beginning in 1892, a group of progressives led by William
U’Ren26 decided to pursue the adoption of the direct initiative in
Oregon.27  Their efforts culminated in the adoption of the initia-
tive and referendum, which passed the legislature in 1901 and
was ratified by Oregon voters on June 2, 1902.28  Since then, Ore-
gon politics has never been the same.29
Oregon was not the first state to adopt the initiative process.30
Oregon, however, was the first to use the initiative,31 and the
practice became widely known as the “Oregon system.”32  Fol-
lowing ratification, the initiative process quickly became a pow-
erful instrument for change.33  Oregonians used the initiative to
enact legislation that reformed presidential primaries and U.S.
Senate elections, banned poll taxes, and provided for women’s
suffrage.34  These reforms reflected the faith of U’Ren and his
followers that corruption and special-interest politics were not an
inevitable part of government.35
Within a decade of its ratification, however, Oregon’s initiative
system shifted away from its progressive roots.36  Professor
David Schuman noted that the initiative’s early days were high-
lighted by attempts “to increase participation, by expanding the
electorate to include previously disenfranchised groups—by ex-
tending self-rule to previously dependent governmental entities,
and by attempting to economically empower previously op-
pressed classes.”37  Following the shift away from progressivism,
however, the initiative process quickly disintegrated into its mod-
ern form—a tool primarily used to disempower, to marginalize,
26 GRUNDSTAD, supra  note 25, at 4 n.8; see  Schuman, supra  note 20, at 952.
27 GRUNDSTAD, supra  note 25, at 4.  This group was inspired by J.W. Sullivan’s
book, Direct Legislation in Switzerland . Id.
28 Schuman, supra  note 20, at 956.  For a more detailed history of the adoption of
the Oregon initiative process, see generally id .
29 Id.  at 956.
30 That honor goes to South Dakota.  Howard R. Ernst, The Historical Role of
Narrow-Material Interests in Initiative Politics , in  DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?  THE
BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 2 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
31 Id.
32 EATON, supra  note 1, at 1.
33 Schuman, supra  note 20, at 958.
34 Cody Hoesly, Comment, Reforming Direct Democracy:  Lessons from Oregon ,
93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2005).
35 Schuman, supra  note 20, at 961.
36 Id.
37 Id . at 962.
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and to create an economic and political elite.38
B. Oregon’s Initiative System Today
Getting a measure on the Oregon ballot today is a fairly in-
volved and expensive process.39  The early steps of qualifying an
initiative include writing the proposed law or amendment and fil-
ing several forms.40  In Oregon, that paperwork includes registra-
tion for a political committee, a statement of how the committee
intends to raise funds, and an indication of whether the petition-
ers intend to pay signature gatherers.41  Upon completion of the
paperwork, the Secretary of State reviews each petition to ensure
legal compliance.42  Following the proponent’s filing, the Secre-
tary of State sends a copy to the Attorney General, who has five
days to write a ballot title and summary.43
Once the ballot title and summary are complete, the Secretary
of State provides copies of the text, title, and summary to the
38 Id.
39 “It takes a lot of money to use the process—it’s been taken out of the average
voter’s hands.” See  David Crary, Citizen Initiative Process Is Now Widely Criticized ,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 14, 2002 (quoting Dane Waters, executive director of the
Initiative and Referendum Institute); see also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OR.,
OREGON’S INITIATIVE SYSTEM:  CURRENT ISSUES (2001), http://www.lwvor.org/doc-
uments/InitiativeSystem2001.htm (describing costs of gathering signatures for vari-
ous Oregon initiatives in the 2000 election cycle).
40 Initial qualification for ballot placement requires twenty-five signatures, the
names and addresses of up to three chief petitioners, and the full text of the pro-
posed law or amendment. OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045(1), (3) (2005); see OR. CONST.
art. IV, § 1(2)(d).
41 Petitioners must indicate whether they intend to pay signature gatherers and
must notify the Secretary of State upon knowledge of any intent to the contrary.
OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045(4).  Further, petitioners must create a political committee,
appoint a treasurer, and indicate how funds will be solicited.  § 260.118.
42 OR. ADMIN. R. 165-014-0028 (2006).
43 §§ 250.035, 250.065; Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. S. Cal. Sch. of Law,
The Basic Steps to Do an Initiative in Oregon  1, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Ore-
gon.htm (follow “Basic Steps to Undertake an Initiative Campaign” hyperlink to
access PDF document) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).  As one writer explained:
[T]he [A]ttorney [G]eneral, with comment from the public, drafts a ballot
title for each statewide measure that includes (a) a “caption of not more
than 15 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter of the state
measure”; (b) a “simple and understandable statement of not more than 25
words that describes the result if the state measure is approved”; (c) a
“simple and understandable statement of not more than 25 words that de-
scribes the result if the state measure is rejected”; and (d) a “concise and
impartial statement of not more than 125 words summarizing the state
measure and its major effect.”
Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1200-01 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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state legislature, proponents, and other concerned parties.44  Af-
ter the initiative is distributed, a fifteen-day comment period
commences in which the public can raise objections to the pro-
posed ballot title, summary, or the full text of an initiative.45
During this fifteen-day comment period, proponents can bring
a challenge of the title or summary’s wording to the Oregon Su-
preme Court.46  Title challenges are common and prevent propo-
nents from collecting signatures until the supreme court resolves
the dispute.47  Proponents often file several nearly identical mea-
sures, or “ballot-title shop,”48 in an effort to get a favorable bal-
lot title.49  If the ballot title is not objected to and the Secretary
of State approves the cover and signature sheets, the proponent
may begin collecting signatures after the fifteen-day comment
period passes.50  Those whose measures were not approved may
file suit and ask the court to declare their petition and initiative
lawful.51
Once proponents secure a ballot title, the largest hurdle is col-
lecting the required number of signatures.  Oregon’s signature
44 Initiative & Referendum Inst., supra  note 43, at 1; see  § 250.067.
45 Initiative & Referendum Inst., supra  note 43, at 1.  Note that no public hearings
are held.
46 Id. ; see  § 250.085.
47 See  § 250.085; William A. Lund, Note, What’s in a Name?  The Battle over Bal-
lot Titles in Oregon , 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 143, 143 (1998); Initiative & Referen-
dum Inst., supra  note 43, at 1.
48 Ballot-title shopping:
involves sponsors filing several versions of the same measure.  Once a com-
mittee of lawyers at the Attorney General’s Office decides on a ballot title,
the backers try to decide how appealing that 25-word summary will be with
voters—most of whom won’t read the initiative’s full text.  And if they’re
not satisfied with the wording, backers will submit a new version with the
hopes that a more voter-friendly title will result.  The practice, which began
in the 1990s, means political foes begin sparring months before they start
trying to sway voters.
David Steves, What?  142 Ballot Measures Filed? Don’t Worry Yet , REGISTER-
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Jan. 6, 2006, at A1.
49 See  Initiative & Referendum Inst., supra  note 43, at 1; see also LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS, supra  note 39 (discussing the various reasons for filing an
initiative).
50 Initiative & Referendum Inst., supra  note 43, at 1; see  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at
1198.
51 See  § 250.085; OR. ADMIN. R. 165-014-0028 (2006).  If the Secretary of State
determines that either the petition or initiative is unlawful, the petitioners must stop
gathering additional signatures. OR. ADMIN R. 165-014-0028.  If such a determina-
tion is made, however, petitioners can bring a challenge to the Secretary of State’s
decision. Id.  If the Secretary or a court declares the petition and initiative lawful,
signature gathering may resume.  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1198-99.
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requirement for ballot placement varies depending on the form
and level of action of direct democracy that the petitioners select.
In Oregon, placing a statutory initiative on the ballot requires
petitioners to gather signatures totaling six percent of the num-
ber of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election.52  All
voters who are eligible to vote for an initiative or referendum
may also sign a petition to place a measure on the ballot.53
Several rules govern the signature gathering phase,54 but some
indications in recent years suggest that these rules are not fol-
lowed or present only a slight inconvenience to petitioners who
can afford to pay signature gatherers.55  Ultimately, while the
state may require petitioners to meet certain thresholds for ballot
qualification, its autonomy over the initiative process is limited
by the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by a few key cases.
II
FEDERALISM AND THE INITIATIVE:  THE IMPACT OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
A. Buckley v. Valeo
At the foundation of initiative regulation is the concept that
money equals speech.  This idea became part of our political sys-
52 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(b).  Initiative amendments have a threshold of eight
percent. Id.  § 1(2)(c).  Only four percent is required for referenda. Id.  § 1(3)(b).
53 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1198.
54 In his Comment, Hoesly summarized some of the important rules governing the
signature gathering process:
Signature gatherers must certify that all signatures were gathered in their
presence and that they believe each signatory is an eligible voter.  Signa-
ture gatherers must also have a copy of the full initiative on them at all
times while gathering signatures for signatories to review.  Signature sheets
must contain ballot titles; captions; and, if signature gatherers are being
paid, a notice stating:  “Some Circulators For This Petition Are Being
Paid.”  Each sheet may only contain signatures from voters of one county.
It is a crime for petitioners and signature gatherers to lie about petitions or
collect false or invalid signatures.  It is also a crime for signatories to
falsely, invalidly, or twice sign a petition.  It is illegal to pay and to accept
payment for signing or not signing a petition.  It is also illegal to buy and
sell signature sheets.  If a chief petitioner is aware that his or her signature
gatherers have violated any statute, he or she is strictly liable for that viola-
tion unless he or she notifies the [S]ecretary of [S]tate.  Further, false ad-
vertising regarding initiatives is prohibited.
Id. at 1199 (citations and footnotes omitted).
55 See  Ellis, supra  note 8, at 63 (“If the initiative proponents have the money,
professional signature companies can virtually guarantee almost any measure a
place on the ballot.”).
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tem in the now-infamous Buckley v. Valeo decision.56  In Buck-
ley , the U.S. Supreme Court held that political campaign
expenditures were political speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.57  The Court reasoned that “virtually every means of com-
municating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure
of money.”58  Despite this reasoning, however, the Court did not
ban all regulation of campaign finances.  The Buckley  Court dif-
ferentiated between contribution and expenditure limits, striking
down expenditure limits as unconstitutional but upholding con-
tribution limits.59  The Court declared that contribution limits
have little direct restraint on political communication as the con-
tributor is still permitted the symbolic expression of support.60
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the purpose of contribu-
tion limits—i.e., to limit the actuality and appearance of corrup-
tion—was permissible because large financial contributions
“given to secure political quid pro quos from current [or] poten-
tial office holders” undermine the integrity of the representative
56 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  Academics have given Buckley v. Valeo mixed reviews.
Many have listed the Buckley  decision “on their list of the ten worst decisions of this
century.”  Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo:  A Landmark of Political Freedom , 33
AKRON L. REV. 7, 7 & n.2 (1999) (citing cases).  In contrast, others view the Buckley
decision as a “landmark of political freedom, a ruling [that] carefully and conscien-
tiously addressed the critical issues of campaign finance controls and free speech
rights [that] still bedevil the nation today.” Id.  at 7-8.  For more information on the
impact of Buckley v. Valeo , see generally Alan B. Morrison, What If . . . Buckley
Were Overturned? , 16 CONST. COMMENT. 347 (1999) (assessing the campaign finance
scene in the event Buckley  is overturned); Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political
Disclosure and the First Amendment , 33 AKRON L. REV. 71 (1999) (discussing dis-
closure issues in the Internet age); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign
Finance Reform , 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311 (discussing possible responses to Buckley ’s
treatment of political money).
57 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”).  While the Court’s juris-
prudence in campaign finance reform has stuck with the Buckley  premise, there has
been some recent deference to states’ interests. See  Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking
the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure
Campaigns , 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 885-86 (2005).  Most recently, the Court in Ran-
dall v. Sorrell , 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006), held in a plurality opinion that a Vermont
campaign finance statute violated the First Amendment free speech protection by
restricting what state candidates could spend during their campaigns and by limiting
individuals’ and organizations’ campaign contributions.
58 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 19; Mark Goodman, Comment, The Coming Clash of
Campaign Finance Enforcement and the Prior Restraint Doctrine , 7 J. L. & SOC.
CHALLENGES 219, 225 (2005).
59 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 58-59; Goodman, supra  note 58, at 225.
60 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 21.
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democracy.61  In contrast, the Court saw expenditure limits as
substantially limiting political speech and conflicting with the
“core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms.”62
B. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
Buckley did not address ballot initiatives, but the Court later
extended the reasoning in Buckley  to First National Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti , holding that limits on corporate expenditures in
ballot initiative campaigns violate the First Amendment.63  Not-
ing that a significant role of the First Amendment is to protect
discussion about government activities, the Court held that cor-
porations and individuals should be treated equally as contribu-
tors to a ballot initiative.64  The Bellotti Court also highlighted
the distinction between constitutional limitations on corporate
campaign contributions to politicians and unconstitutional limita-
tions on corporate spending in initiative campaigns.65  To justify
the distinction, the Court referred to the concern in Buckley  re-
garding the potential for corruption or the potential appearance
of corruption due to the quid pro quo influence that money may
have on a candidate once he or she is in office.66  The Court
viewed the potential for and appearance of corruption as an issue
faced solely by individual candidates and not applicable to initia-
tive campaigns.67
Such a view, however, ignores the fact that initiative campaigns
“can be ‘bought’ as easily as an individual candidate’s.”68  Indi-
viduals, corporations, and special interest groups would not be
willing to spend so much money if they did not have a considera-
ble interest in the initiative’s outcome.69  It is arguable that the
financial influence of ballot initiative campaigns is more hazard-
61 Id.  at 26-27.
62 Id.  at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
63 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
64 Id.  at 776-77; Jodi Miller, Comment, “Democracy in Free Fall”:  The Use of
Ballot Initiatives to Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs , 1999
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 28.
65 See Bellotti , 435 U.S. at 788 n.26; Miller, supra  note 64, at 28.
66 Miller, supra  note 64, at 28; see Bellotti , 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
67 See  John B. Anderson & Nancy C. Ciampa, Ballot Initiatives:  Recommenda-
tions for Change , 71 FLA. B.J., Apr. 1997, at 71, 72.
68 Id.
69 See id. ; see also  Miller, supra  note 64, at 29 (“[L]arge monetary contributions
have an equally real and profound effect on the success or failure of an initiative.”).
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ous to the political system than the corruption of individual office
holders because initiatives can be used to change or create laws
without the checks and balances of our representative govern-
ment.70  And yet it is in the initiative process that the Court has
refused to apply the reasoning that the government has an inter-
est in preventing the “real or imagined coercive influence of
large financial contributions.”71  The Supreme Court furthered
this error in Meyer v. Grant72  where the Court ignored the
power of the initiative, the states’ need to regulate initiative cam-
paigns, and the possibility for money to corrupt such campaigns.
C. Meyer v. Grant
In Meyer , petitioners challenged a Colorado statute that
criminalized paying signature gatherers in initiative campaigns.73
Comparing the prohibition to the campaign expenditure limita-
tions struck down in Buckley , Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, said that banning the payment of signature gatherers re-
stricted free speech by limiting “the number of voices who will
convey appellees’ message and the hours they can speak and,
therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach.”74  Jus-
tice Stevens also noted that the payment ban restricted speech by
making it more difficult for initiative proponents to qualify their
issues for the ballot “thus reducing the chances for proponents to
make their proposals the focus of extensive debate.”75  Relying
on the reasoning from Buckley , the Court held that the govern-
ment could not limit the speech of one group with the purpose of
enhancing the relative speech of another group.76
D. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation
More recently in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation , the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of
70 See  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:  Democracy’s Barrier to Racial
Equality , 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1978) (“[W]e vote politicians into office, not
into law.  Once in office, they may become well-informed, responsible representa-
tives; at the least, their excesses may be curtailed by the checks and balances of the
political process.”).
71 See  Miller, supra  note 64, at 28-29 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976)).
72 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
73 Id.  at 417.
74 Id.  at 422-23; see  Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 182.
75 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 182; see Meyer , 486 U.S. at 423.
76 See Meyer , 486 U.S. at 426 n.7.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE105.txt unknown Seq: 12 21-NOV-06 8:39
286 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 275
Meyer  to strike down multiple provisions of a Colorado statute
governing its ballot initiative petition process.77  The Court
struck down one provision that petitioners report the names of
and payments made to signature gatherers.78  Additionally, the
Court struck down requirements that signature gatherers must
(1) be registered voters79 and (2) wear name badges.80  In re-
jecting Colorado’s argument that these statutes were necessary to
prevent fraud, the Court determined that other Colorado laws
sufficiently protected the integrity of the initiative process.81
E. The Initiative Today
This line of Supreme Court rulings has tied the states’ hands
with regard to the tools they may use to control state election
issues.  In Meyer,  Justice Stevens appears to have held a romanti-
cized vision of an initiative process that involves a dedicated
band of public-spirited volunteers who are committed to their
cause and brave the elements in order to obtain signatures
needed for their petition.82  However, while an initiative process
similar to this vision may have existed at one time, today’s initia-
tive process is wholly different.83
77 525 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1999).
78 Id.  at 204.
79 Id.  at 194-95.
80 Id.  at 199-200.
81 Id.  at 196, 198, 204 n.24.  The Court’s rhetoric is that the “states have ‘consider-
able leeway’ to protect direct democracy’s integrity and reliability”; in reality, how-
ever, “the Court has not upheld many state regulations.”  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at
1214.
82 See  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988).  For more information regard-
ing the tension between campaign finance regulation, ballot-initiative issues, and
free speech limitations, see generally Michael Carlin, Note, Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.:  Emblem of the Struggle Between Citizens’ First
Amendment Rights and States’ Regulatory Interests in Election Issues , 78 N.C. L.
REV. 477 (2000) (discussing the tension between direct democracy, regulation, and
free speech) and Ryan K. Manger, Note, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation:  Can the State Preserve Direct Democracy for the Citizen, or Will It Be
Consumed by the Special Interest Group? , 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 177 (2000)
(discussing the fact that initiative processes are designed to enhance the power of
individual citizens but are abused by special interest groups).
83 In contrast to the version of the signature gathering process adopted by Justice
Stevens, Lowenstein and Stern offer a version from an interview with the late Ed
Koupal, who was the most successful manager of volunteer petition drives in Califor-
nia during the 1970s:
“Generally, people who are out getting signatures are too god-damned in-
terested in their ideology to get the required number in the required time,”
Koupal said.  “We use the hoopla process.  First, you set up a table with six
petitions taped to it and a sign in front that says, [‘sign here’].  One person
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Gathering signatures to register ballot initiatives has become a
big business.84  The vast majority of people collecting signatures
today are not idealistic volunteers.  Instead they are only inter-
ested in being paid for gathering signatures and are “largely in-
different to the substance of the petition.”85  As noted by
Professor Ellis, because a signature gatherer’s income increases
with each signature gathered:
Many would be as gratified to have you sign a petition that
called for a raise in taxes as they would be to get your signa-
ture on a petition seeking a reduction in taxes.  And they
would be happier still if you signed both petitions, and per-
haps another two or three or five while you are at it.86
Because citizens are often willing to sign petitions for reasons
unrelated to content,87 today’s reality is that anyone willing to
put up the money can “buy a place on the ballot.”88  Further-
more, the expense associated with qualifying an initiative for the
statewide ballot is cost-prohibitive to all except well-financed or-
ganizations and the wealthiest individuals.89  As a result, the initi-
ative process has been captured by the big money and special
sits at the table.  Another person stands in front.  That’s all you need—two
people.
“While one person sits at the table, the other walks up to people and
asks two questions.  (We operate on the old selling maxim that two yesses
make a sale.)  First, we ask if they are a registered voter.  If they say yes, we
ask them if they are registered in that county.  If they say yes to that, we
immediately push them up to the table where the person sitting points to a
petition and says, ‘Sign this.’  By this time the person feels, ‘Oh[,] goodie, I
get to play,’ and signs it.  If a table doesn’t get 80 signatures an hour using
this method, it’s moved the next day.”
Koupal said that about 75% of the people sign when they’re told to.
“Hell no, people don’t ask to read the petition and we certainly don’t of-
fer,” he added.  “Why try to educate the world when you’re trying to get
signatures?”
Lowenstein and Stern, supra  note 12, at 197 (citing Carla Lazzareschi Duscha, The
Koupals’ Petition Factory , 6 CAL. J. 83, 83 (1975) (omission in original)).
84 See  Ellis, supra  note 8, at 37.
85 Id.
86 Id. See generally RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS:  THE INITIA-
TIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 49-65 (2002) (discussing the decline of the volunteer and
rise of the professional).  In Oregon, signature gatherers are currently not allowed to
be paid per signature. See infra  note 211.  However, per-signature payment has
been and still is the norm in most initiative states. See  Ellis, supra  note 8, at 37.
87 See  Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 12, at 180 (noting that people are per-
suaded to sign petitions for reasons other than the political validity of the cause
espoused).
88 Id.  at 199-200.
89 Id.  at 176.
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interests that it was created to circumvent—grassroots democ-
racy has degenerated into a “greenback democracy.”90
Concerns about wealthy individuals and interest groups buying
their way onto the ballot are not new.91  In a 1915 account of the
Oregon ballot initiative system, Professor Barnett said, “[When]
the ‘professional circulator’ is largely responsible for placing on
the ballot measures in which he has only a pecuniary interest, the
petition is deprived of true representative character, and law-
making becomes a mercenary matter.”92  Professor Barnett
noted over ninety years ago that “[t]he critical weakness in the
. . . system is that it gives the interests that can command money a
practical monopoly of the business of petition making.”93  When
faced with this problem, early users of the initiative suggested
banning the payment of signature gatherers on the premise that
“[i]f a measure is not of sufficient importance and public interest
to enlist the voluntary service of the people in circulating peti-
tions, it should never go before the people under the initiative or
referendum.”94
In 1935, this argument prevailed and Oregonians outlawed the
payment of signature gatherers.95  The ban stayed in effect until
the 1982 district court decision Libertarian Party of Oregon v.
Paulus96  invalidated the law.  The court reasoned that the ban
“restricts the candidate’s opportunity to get his view across to the
public by circulating petitions; it restricts the discussion of issues
that normally accompanies the circulation of petitions; and it re-
stricts the size of the audience that can be reached.”97
90 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 58.
91 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1202.
92 JAMES D. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL IN OREGON 60 (1915).
93 Id.  at 60-61 (quoting EUGENE REGISTER, Dec. 31, 1913, at 4).
94 Id.  at 62 (quoting OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar. 27, 1908, at 8).
95 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 47.  Unfortunately, the legislative history of this law was
lost in the fire that destroyed Oregon’s Capitol on April 25, 1935. See  Wayne Pettit,
Flames Raze Oregon Capitol; Fireman Killed: Records Burned in Costly Blaze ,
MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland), Apr. 26, 1935, at 1.  However, former Oregon
Senator Richard Neuberger was able to offer a perspective on the state of the initia-
tive near that time in his book Our Promised Land . See RICHARD L. NEUBERGER,
OUR PROMISED LAND 140-63 (1938).
96 Libertarian Party of Or. v. Paulus, No. 82-521-FR, slip op. at 4 (D. Or. Sept. 3,
1982).  This sentiment was moved to the national level when Justice Stevens wrote
for the court in Meyer v. Grant , which determined that Colorado’s ban of paid cir-
culators was unconstitutional.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988).
97 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY:  POPULISM REVISED 73
(1986) (quoting Paulus , No. 82-521-FR, slip op. at 4); Ellis, supra note 8, at 47.
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In the years that paying signature gatherers was prohibited, the
number of initiatives on the ballot significantly decreased.98
From 1904 until 1935, the ballot averaged approximately nine ini-
tiatives per election cycle.99  From 1936 to 1982, when paid signa-
ture gathering was prohibited, that average dropped to roughly
three initiatives per election.100  And then from 1983 to 2004, fol-
lowing Paulus  and later Meyer v. Grant , the average went back
up to just over ten initiatives per election cycle.101  To some, this
does not matter.  Others believe that there should be as many
initiatives on the ballot as there can be.102  Oregon initiative ac-
tivist Bill Sizemore has argued that “[a]ll of politics is run by
money,” and to say that the initiative system should be different
is “hypocritical.”103
Admittedly today’s political scene is inundated with money.104
Candidates spend hundreds of thousands and even millions of
dollars to run for office.105  But does this make Bill Sizemore cor-
rect?  Is it hypocritical to think the initiative system should be
98 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUEBOOK 2005-2006, at 281-303 (2005).
99 From 1904 to 1934, there were 146 initiatives on the statewide ballot in Oregon.
Id.  at 282-88.
100 From 1936 to 1982, there were seventy-three initiatives on the statewide ballot
in Oregon. Id.  at 288-95.
101 From 1984 to 2004, there were 112 initiatives on the statewide ballot in Ore-
gon. Id.  at 295-303.
102 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 38-39 (quoting initiative activist Bill Sizemore as saying,
“It’s really irrelevant who puts it on the ballot, because Oregonians, and only
Oregonians, can vote yes or no”).
103 Id.  at 37.
104 The Federal Election Commission tracks federal campaign contributions and
expenditures.  Many groups have taken and sorted the commission’s data for analy-
sis and easy public consumption. See, e.g , Political Money Line, Money in Politics
Databases, http://www.fecinfo.com/ (last visited July 27, 2006) (providing news dedi-
cated to the topic of political money).  For recent commentary on the state of fi-
nance reform, see generally Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs:  The
Compelling Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected
Officials , 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2006) (discussing solutions to the problem of
legislators’ time being consumed by fundraising, distracting them from the process
of governing), and Meredith A. Johnston, Note, Stopping “Winks and Nods”:  Limits
on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations , 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1166 (2006) (discussing the imposition of limits for independent political organiza-
tions not currently subject to hard and fast rules regarding campaign finance).
105 In the 2002 federal election cycle, Senate and House candidates spent $357.7
million between January 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002.  That still left them with $373.2
million, presumably to be spent through Election Day.  For an eye-opening look at
campaign spending, see Press Release, FEC, FEC Releases Congressional Fundrais-
ing Summary (Sept. 9, 2002) http://www.fec.gov/press/press2002/20020909canstats/
20020909canstat.html.
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held to a different standard?  Professor Ellis noted that “defend-
ers of the initiative process raise an important challenge:  Why
should we be more wary about the role of money in the initiative
process than in candidate elections?”106
III
INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS DIFFER FROM
CANDIDATE CAMPAIGNS
A. Checks, Balances, and Campaign Finance Reform
The initiative system should be treated differently than candi-
date elections because it was created to be the people’s check on
unresponsive or corrupt representatives.107  William U’Ren and
his followers intended the initiative to be a tool for progressive
grassroots efforts to champion better government and progres-
sive policies.108  Oregon adopted the initiative to give a voice to
dispersed popular movements that generally lack the more tradi-
tional lobbying influence.109  As Lowenstein and Stern observed,
Justice Frankfurter noted:
that [the] institutions of direct democracy, like all other electo-
ral mechanisms, are controversial because they are conducive
to the needs of some interests relative to others.  Indeed, one
of the guiding principles of the Constitution itself was to cre-
ate a balance among institutions, each of which would tend to
be most responsive to different groups and interests.110
The Constitution did not create direct democracy, however, so
the initiative should be used with caution.  Without the same
checks and balances present in the rest of our government, the
initiative can be a powerful tool or a dangerous weapon.  As Al-
len Eaton observed in his 1912 book on the Oregon system:
[T]he people of the state of Oregon enjoy a very wide political
power—so wide that they may do anything in politics that they
please to do.  There are practically no restraints upon their
power . . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]hrough the Initiative, the people have not only taken
over to themselves powers which they once delegated to the
Legislature, but have taken even greater powers than those
106 Ellis, supra  note 8,  at 37-38.
107 See supra  note 19.
108 See  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1212.
109 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 200.
110 Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 299 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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originally set forth in the constitution.  The people of Oregon
can and do not only make laws independent of the Legisla-
ture, but pass constitutional amendments at will.  But this is
not all:  the governor cannot exercise his veto of any measure
passed upon by the people.
. . . .
. . . [I]t cannot be denied that they have set up another legis-
lative branch of government with greater power and less re-
strictions than were originally provided by our constitution.111
Much of Eaton’s observation holds true today and emphasizes
the initiative system’s unique role.  Attempts to compare initia-
tive campaigns to candidate campaigns fail for two reasons.  First,
under current campaign finance laws, individuals are limited in
the amount they can directly contribute to a candidate.112  In
contrast, there are no limits on what individuals can contribute to
an initiative.113  As Professor Ellis noted, “If paying people to
petition is . . . no different from giving money to candidates, then
that is an argument for restricting the amount people can con-
tribute to an initiative campaign (or for abolishing laws limiting
contributions to candidate campaigns).”114  Second, major party
candidates only appear on the general election ballot after win-
ning the primary election of the candidate’s party.115  In contrast,
signatures are generally the only thing that may show public sup-
port for an initiative prior to it appearing on the ballot.116  Pro-
fessor Ellis noted, “If signatures gathered are not an indicator of
public sentiment but merely a function of money, then critics are
right to single out the role of money in the initiative process.”117
As we have seen, numerous initiative professionals recognize
that with enough money, anything can be qualified for the bal-
lot.118  Therefore, we must protect the initiative process as a tool
for the people.  The current system readily allows the initiative to
111 EATON, supra  note 1, at 6, 8, 12; see BRODER, supra  note 17, at 37-38.






118 See id.  at 63 (“If the initiative proponents have the money, professional signa-
ture companies can virtually guarantee almost any measure a place on the ballot
. . . .”); see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE:
ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 102 (1998) (arguing against signature gathering
requirements since “political interests with sufficient funding and professional assis-
tance can qualify nearly anything they want for the ballot”).
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be wielded with a heavy hand by special interests purporting to
speak for the “people.”
B. What’s in a Name?
Some do not believe that limiting access to the ballot matters
because the people ultimately vote on an issue.  They are wrong.
First, the trouble with this argument is that it ignores the power
wielded by the individuals and organizations who frame the is-
sue.119  Any pollster could tell you that public opinion on many
issues is extraordinarily sensitive to a question’s wording.120  The
psychological impact of wording combined with the fact that ini-
tiative wording is often “lengthy, complex, and ambiguous” leads
to voter confusion and miscast votes.121
Furthermore, initiative information generally lacks the short-
hand identifiers associated with political party sponsorship.122
Research has revealed that a significant majority of a state’s pop-
ulation will likely lack the requisite reading comprehension level
to understand traditional ballot language.123  As a result, support
for a ballot initiative largely depends on how the question is
posed or the title is worded.124
An initiative’s ballot title can also be confusing and mislead-
ing.125  The ballot title’s wording can even confuse voters as to
119 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 39.
120 See id.  Professor Ellis notes, as examples, that people are more likely to sup-
port spending for the “poor” as compared to spending on “welfare.” Id.  Similarly,
people disfavor the term “preferential treatment” in comparison to “affirmative ac-
tion.” Id.  Finally, large majorities feel that terminal patients should be allowed to
have a physician’s help to “die with dignity,” but comparatively few support “physi-
cian-assisted suicide.” Id.
121 See  Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus:  Judicial Review
of Initiatives , 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 248 (1999).
122 Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local
Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism:  The Prop-
erty Tax as a Case in Point , 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 554 (2002).
123 Id. at 555; Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”:  Interpretive Di-
lemmas in Direct Democracy , 105 YALE L.J. 107, 139-40 (1995).  David Magleby’s
study of the ballot language used from 1970 to 1979 in California, Massachusetts,
Oregon, and Rhode Island revealed the need for a fifteenth- to eighteenth-grade
reading level to understand ballot language. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLA-
TION:  VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 118-19 (1984).
Not even twenty percent of voting adults were likely to have attained that level of
education. Id.  at 119.
124 See  Ellis, supra  note 8, at 39.
125 David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?  An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process , 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 38-39 (1995).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE105.txt unknown Seq: 19 21-NOV-06 8:39
2006] Can Oregon Give the Ballot Initiative to the People Again? 293
the meaning of a “yes” vote.126  The ballot title experience was
summed up by one Oregon petitioner who said, “We couldn’t get
the words ‘spending’ and ‘limit’ in the ballot title—and that’s
what it was, a spending limit.  We just wanted a simple ballot title
so the average guy doesn’t need a law degree to understand what
he’s voting on.”127
C. Political Agendas and Crypto-Initiatives
Beyond crafting the impact of an initiative’s wording, petition-
ers are able to influence the political menu and limit voter
choice.128  One of the best examples of controlling the political
menu in Oregon, if not the country, has to be Bill Sizemore’s
efforts in the 1990s.129  A Willamette Week  article stated, “Bill
Sizemore did for signature gathering in the 1990s what Ray Kroc
did for McDonald’s in the 1950s. Both men would turn their re-
spective industries from sleepy, localized concerns into vertically
integrated, massively financed enterprises.”130
One way that Sizemore’s framing of issues made a difference
was by only giving voters a choice between the status quo and the
initiative.  For example, in 1996, Oregon voters voted for Mea-
sure 47, which severely reduced property taxes.131  One critic
analogized Measure 47 to “killing an ant with a bazooka” with
the problem being that “a bazooka is the only weapon at [the
126 Catherine Engberg, Note, Taking the Initiative:  May Congress Reform State
Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of Government? , 54 STAN. L.
REV. 569, 577 (2001).
127 See  Steves, supra  note 48, at A1.
128 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 40.
129 Bill Sizemore, a former Bible teacher, gubernatorial candidate, and business-
man, “was the reigning king of direct democracy in Oregon.”  Hoesly, supra  note 34,
at 1206.  He led his group, Oregon Taxpayers United, “in placing antitax and anti-
labor initiatives on the ballot nearly every year.” Id. His power stemmed from the
ability of Oregon Taxpayers United to get an issue on the ballot.  “Even when Size-
more’s initiatives failed, he fulfilled his objective by distracting unions from pushing
their own initiatives.” Id.  Despite being convicted of racketeering, Sizemore is still
active in Oregon’s ballot initiative process and was associated with fifteen proposed
measures for the upcoming 2006 initiative season. See  Steves, supra  note 48, at A1.
So far, his proposal on reforming insurance rates is the first initiative to qualify for
the November ballot.  Dave Hogan, Sizemore’s Back on Ballot:  This Time, About
Insurance , OREGONIAN (Portland), July 20, 2006, at A1.
130 Matt Buckingham, The Signature King , WILLAMETTE WEEK (Portland, Or.),
Mar. 9, 2005, at 68.
131 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 41.
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taxpayer’s] disposal at the moment.”132  Rather than being given
the opportunity to choose between a huge tax cut and a moder-
ate tax cut, voters were only offered a choice between the huge
tax cut or no tax cut at all.133  Professor Ellis explains that “while
the vote on Measure 47 reflected the majority’s preference for
lower property taxes (fifty-two percent supported the measure),
the precise policies . . . that were enacted did not reflect the will
of the voters so much as the will of the measure’s author, Bill
Sizemore.”134
Not all of Bill Sizemore’s initiatives have passed.  In 1998 and
2000, Oregonians did choose the status quo over the bazooka a
few times.135  However, the mere presence of these initiatives on
the ballot allowed Sizemore to accomplish his political goals.136
Whether on taxes or unions,137 Sizemore’s initiatives forced his
political adversaries to play defense and limited their ability to
push an alternative agenda.138  Following the 2000 election, Size-
more assistant Becky Miller exulted, “Imagine the mischief [the
unions] could have done in Oregon if they had had that money to
spend on something else . . . . They were completely tied up try-
ing to play defense and were not able to play offense.”139  De-
spite the defeat of six Sizemore initiatives in 2000, he was able to
dictate Oregon’s political agenda.
Many scholars believe that initiatives are simply citizen efforts
to control public policy.140  However, a growing number of initia-
tives are being designed with policy as a secondary concern at
best.  Professors Thad Kousser and Mathew McCubbins term
these initiatives “crypto-initiatives,” where the motives of their
sponsors and their connections to political parties are hidden.141
They point to the November 2004 “defense of marriage” initia-
tives in eleven states, including Oregon, as a primary example of
132 Id.  (quoting James Mayer, The Property Tax Puzzle:  Will Measure 47 Make
Oregon’s System More Fair? , OREGONIAN (Portland), Sept. 23, 1996, at A8).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.  at 43.
136 Id.
137 A large majority of Sizemore’s initiatives have focused on decreasing taxes and
the power of labor unions. See  Buckingham, supra  note 130, at 68.
138 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 44.
139 Id.  (alteration and omission in original).
140 Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and
Policymaking by Direct Democracy , 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 969 (2005).
141 Id.  at 969-70.
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the recent use of crypto-initiatives.142  Coordination between
state Republican leaders and the White House on the “defense
of marriage” initiatives helped increase Republican turnout and
secure a Bush victory.143
In sum, placing an initiative on the ballot is about more than
just voting a measure up or down.  Certainly proponents gener-
ally want their initiative to pass, but simply getting it on the bal-
lot is often a victory.  Bill Sizemore once asked, “Which makes
more sense—paying a politician to increase your taxes, or paying
a petitioner to collect signatures to give you a chance to vote on
lowering your taxes?”144  Getting an initiative on the ballot is not
only a chance for proponents to pass legislation, it is also a way
to dictate the political agenda.  Win or lose, getting an issue on
the ballot has significant consequences.  Signature gatherers’
popular technique of telling potential signers that they do not
have to make up their mind at that moment, but simply give the
issue a chance to be on the ballot is not true.  The decision to sign
is a decision to support what issues make up the political menu
and dictates the choices that voters have.  Again, this is a power-
ful tool and should be treated accordingly.145
D. How Much Does Direct Democracy Cost?
There are those who would argue that the initiative battle is
142 Id.  at 970.
143 Id.  at 970-71.  Professors Kousser and McCubbins admit that Karl Rove may
be the only person who knows the full extent and impact of this coordination.  For a
more detailed examination of crypto-initiatives, see id. See also  Elizabeth Garrett,
Commentary, Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid Democracy , 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 985
(2005) (discussing the interaction between the citizenry and crypto-initiatives—
those initiatives that are created and supported by “agenda setters” for whom
changing public policy is not a primary goal).
144 Hoesly, supra note 34, at 1207.
145 Lowenstein and Stern wrote:
It should be made clear that the voter has every right to sign an initiative
out of a belief that all proposals should be given a chance, or because of
sympathy with the circulator, or because of a reluctance to turn down a
stranger who asks a favor in a public place, or for any other reason.  The
point is not that petition signers are doing anything blameworthy.  The
point is that in so acting, they create enough static that the system cannot
discern the message it was designed to receive, namely, how many voters
out there want this proposal to become law.  Not necessarily by design, the
system adjusted itself, discerning a message that was different but still good
enough, namely, whether there are a number of people who care enough
about this proposal that they are willing to make a substantial personal
sacrifice in its behalf.
Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 12, at 204.
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simply politics, and the old adage “all is fair” should apply.146
This may be so, but the cost of the initiative process may cause
those arguing this point to think again.  While the costs to indi-
viduals and groups who wish to qualify and campaign for an initi-
ative are undoubtedly high, the primary costs are incurred by the
state and, in turn, taxpayers.  These costs come in many forms:
from actual dollars and wasted resources to an overburdened and
distrusted judiciary.147
1. Actual Dollars
As Oregonians gear up for the 2006 ballot initiative season,
state legal and elections officials have been devoting countless
hours of work to many of these proposed initiatives.148  The Ore-
gon Elections Division Director described the effort to verify sig-
natures, draft ballot titles, and resolve the legal challenges
associated with the initiative as “very process-intensive.”149  With
the proliferation of ballot-title shopping, the workload becomes
even more intense for elections workers, lawyers with the Attor-
ney General’s Office, and the Oregon Supreme Court.150
As the workload increases, so has the price tag for Oregon tax-
payers.151  The Attorney General’s Office estimates its cost in
drafting ballot titles and defending them once they are written to
be between $350,000 and $360,000, which has increased from
about $303,000 in 2001 through 2003.152
2. Time Is Money
Aside from the Attorney General’s Office, the Oregon Su-
preme Court is also impacted by ballot title challenges.  During
the 2000 general election cycle, more than twenty-five percent of
the Oregon Supreme Court’s caseload was devoted to initiative
146 See supra  notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
147 See  B. Carlton Grew, Governing by Initiative:  The Rise and Fall—and Rise
Again—of Oregon’s Initiative Ballot Measure , 61 OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2000, at 9, 9
(discussing the costs of the initiative process in Oregon); see also  James C. Foster,
The Interplay of Legitimacy, Elections, and Crocodiles in the Bathtub:  Making Sense
of Politicization of Oregon’s Appellate Courts , 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1313, 1313-
14 (2003) (noting that people get “hoppin’ mad at judges” when they perceive court
decisions as preempting popular majorities).
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disputes, primarily ballot title challenges.153
Moreover, ballot title challenges are just the beginning of the
process for the courts.  After the title challenges are settled, sig-
natures must be gathered, and if there are enough valid signa-
tures, the measure is then submitted to the voters.154  Once the
votes are counted, opponents of an initiative that passes often
bring suit to throw out the results.  In the past twenty-five years,
nearly half of the voter-approved initiatives have been taken to
court by opponents.155
That is not to say that these challenges are without merit.  In
fact, nearly half of the challenged initiatives in the last twenty-
five years have been invalidated in whole or in part by the
courts.156  The high number of court challenges to initiatives has
been attributed to “the lack of checks and balances in the initia-
tive writing process.”157  When laws are created by representative
government, the courts are the last in a series of institutional re-
views.158  In the initiative process, however, the courts are often
the only governmental institution that may review the law.159
Placed in this position, the courts must either defer to the “peo-
ple’s will” or serve as “watchdogs” by vigorously reviewing the
process.160
3. Attack on the Judiciary
Recent decisions by the Oregon courts have indicated their
willingness to serve the “watchdog” role over the initiative pro-
cess.161  Rulings have limited where petitioners can work,162 and
the use of constitutional initiatives was limited through the sepa-
rate-vote rule established in Armatta v. Kitzhaber .163  Addition-
ally, an Oregon federal district court decision limiting the
employment relationship between paid signature gatherers and
153 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra  note 39.
154 OR. REV. STAT. § 250.105 (2005).






161 See infra Part IV.A.1. But see  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 340 Or.
117, 130 P.3d 308 (2006) (upholding the constitutionality of the property-compensa-
tion initiative known as Measure 37).
162 Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 11 P.3d 228 (2000).
163 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998); see infra  notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
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the chief petitioners was recently upheld by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.164  These limitations have made some initia-
tive activists feel that the Oregon courts have put too many con-
straints on the process.165
By playing the watchdog role, the courts bear the brunt of the
heat generated by post-passage scrutiny of initiatives.166  Most
notably, the Oregon Supreme Court’s separate-vote jurispru-
dence167 has angered many career petitioners, making them wary
of wasting time and resources on initiatives that will ultimately
be struck down.168
As petitioners begin to view judges as obstacles limiting their
agenda, they have in turn begun to attack the judiciary.169  Initial
attempts were aimed at limiting the powers of the judiciary to
rule on voter-passed initiatives.170  In 2000, Measure 96 was pro-
posed and ultimately defeated; however, had it passed it would
have prevented nearly all attempts to limit the initiative sys-
tem.171  The following year brought a proposed initiative that
would have undone the court’s separate-vote jurisprudence in
the Armatta  line of cases,172 but it failed to make the ballot.173
164 Prete v. Bradbury, No. 03-6357-AA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28738 (D. Or. Feb.
18, 2004), aff’d , 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006).
165 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra  note 39.
166 For some judges, playing the role of watchdog may put their judicial careers at
stake. See infra  text accompanying notes 177-81.
167 “The Oregon Supreme Court recently rediscovered another provision of the
state constitution.  Article XVII, section 1 requires that any ‘two or more amend-
ments’ must be ‘separately’ submitted to the voters.”  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1220.
Before Armatta v. Kitzhaber  in 1998, the separate-vote requirement had not been
addressed. Id.  In deciding Armatta , the Oregon Supreme Court struck down Mea-
sure 40, an anticrime initiative, because of “substantive” alterations to the Oregon
Constitution that did not meet a “closely related” threshold. Armatta , 327 Or. at
283-84, 959 P.2d at 67-68.  The court decided the initiative’s defects were incurable
and struck Measure 40 entirely. Id.  at 289-90, 959 P.2d at 71.  Since then, the court
has not been shy about wielding the sword it created in Armatta .  Hoesly, supra  note
34, at 1220.
168 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1225.
169 Following the district court decision in MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. ,
No. 05C10444 (Or. Cir. Ct. Marion County Oct. 14, 2005), rev’d , 340 Or. 117, 130
P.3d 308 (2006), available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37_
000.pdf, which temporarily struck down the voter-approved Measure 37, some ob-
servers felt that the decision reflected a larger problem with judicial activism:  “This
is telling everybody our vote doesn’t mean squat.  We need new judges.”  Laura
Oppenheimer, Judge Razes Measure 37 Land Law , OREGONIAN (Portland), Oct. 15,
2005, at A1 (quoting Barbara Prete, chief petitioner for Measure 37).
170 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1225.
171 SECRETARY OF STATE, supra  note 98, at 301; Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1225.
172 See infra  text accompanying notes 190-99.
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After Stranahan v. Fred Meyer ,174 where the Oregon Supreme
Court overruled its nine-year-old precedent and held that there
is no right to gather signatures at shopping centers and malls,
Oregon conservatives began going after the judiciary directly.175
In 2002, petitioners introduced two measures that made the bal-
lot but were narrowly defeated.  The first measure was aimed at
making judicial reelection more difficult, and the other was in-
tended to create geographic judicial districts.176
More recently, after the district court decision in MacPherson ,
which overturned voter-approved Measure 37,177 angry Oregoni-
ans rallied to remove the ruling judge from the bench.178  The
recall petition filed against the judge stated that “[b]y overruling
Measure 37, Judge Mary James has disregarded the express will
of the people of Oregon.”179  While the Judge James recall has
run into problems,180 it is a reminder of the risk judges assume by
serving as watchdog of the initiative process.  The recall petition
173 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1225.
174 Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 11 P.3d 228 (2000).
175 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1225.  While the measures that have been struck
down have largely been considered “conservative,” Measure 37 provides a notable
exception.  Surprisingly, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Measure 37 was
constitutional in MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. , 340 Or. 117, 122, 130 P.3d
308, 312 (2006). In writing for the court, Chief Justice Paul De Muniz noted that the
constitutionality determination “is the only one that this court is empowered to
make” and that “[w]hether Measure 37 as a policy choice is wise or foolish, far-
sighted or blind, is beyond this court’s purview.” Id.  at 141, 130 P.3d at 322.  Time
will tell whether or not MacPherson  signals a larger shift in the Oregon Supreme
Court’s treatement of initiatives.  For more on Measure 37, see generally Keith
Aoki, Kim Briscoe & Ben Hovland, Trading Spaces: Measure 37,  MacPherson v.
Department of Administrative Services, and Transferable Development Rights as a
Path Out of Deadlock , 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 273 (2006).
176 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1225.  Measure 21 was a constitutional amendment
that would have allowed voters to mark “None of the Above” in judicial elections,
thus making reelection more difficult. Id.  Measure 22 would have created a consti-
tutional amendment imposing geographic election districts for state appellate
judges, thereby limiting the number of judges elected from the comparatively liberal
Willamette Valley.  Id.
177 Oregonians in Action’s President David Hunnicutt referred to MacPherson  as
“the height of judicial activism.”  Press Release, Oregonians in Action, Marion
County Judge Overturns Measure 37 (Oct. 14, 2005), http://oia.org/Measure37over
turnPR.htm (last visited June 11, 2006).
178 Julie Sullivan, Firestorm over Measure 37 Clouds Judge’s Long-Held Dream ,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Dec. 4, 2005, at B1.
179 Id.
180 The drive for signatures is now encountering technical difficulties because
some of the signature pages did not bear the required identification numbers.  David
Steves, Recall Petitions for Salem Judge May Be Recalled , REGISTER-GUARD (Eu-
gene, Or.), Jan. 10, 2006, at D1.
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also exposes another weakness of the initiative system.  When
judges are elected, as in Oregon, a ruling contrary to the popular
will, regardless of the reasoning, may be costly.181
Courts may find it easier to overturn initiatives that are prima-
rily driven by small, well-financed special interests.  However,
playing “watchdog” over the initiative process has an inherent
risk.  When popular initiatives are overturned by the courts,
voter frustration is common and leads voters to agree with anti-
court sentiments.182  Initiative scholars have learned that “[o]nce
the participatory system is established . . . it becomes self-
sustaining because the very qualities that are required by individ-
ual citizens if the system is to work successfully are those that the
process of participation itself develops and fosters.”183
This sentiment, coupled with the facts that (1) proponents of
the initiative can be counted on to fill the media with rhetoric
criticizing the judiciary184 and (2) rulings that rebuff the majority
may appear paternalistic,185 leads to public distrust of the
courts.186  As Professor Julian Eule wrote, “It is one thing for a
court to undertake the task of protecting the people from their
181 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1226. Oregon’s judiciary has shown recently that it is
willing to accept the risks of serving as a watchdog. See infra  notes 190-98 and ac-
companying text.  This may be due to the judges’ commitment to the law or to the
rarity of judicial recalls.  Sullivan, supra  note 178, at B1 (noting statistical rarity of
judicial recall).  While the threat of judicial recall may seem at odds with this Com-
ment’s suggestion that the initiative has been commandeered by well-financed spe-
cial interests, these ideas can coexist.  Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans
Linde noted that “[i]t no longer is political suicide to question the shibboleth of
unconstrained lawmaking by simple majority of those choosing to vote on any kind
of initiative.”  Linde, supra note 18, at 399.  Conversely, late California Supreme
Court Justice Otto Kaus observed that “ignoring the political consequences of visi-
ble decisions is ‘like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.’”  Richard L. Hasen,
“High Court Wrongly Elected”:  A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implica-
tions for the Voting Rights Act , 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1997).  Ultimately, both
former jurists are correct.
182 Kenneth P. Miller, Courts as Watchdogs of the Washington State Initiative Pro-
cess , 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (2001).
183 Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok:  The Costs of Mass Participation for Delib-
erative Agency Decisionmaking , 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 210 (1997) (quoting CAR-
OLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 25 (1970)) (omission in
original).
184 After a Washington judge overturned a voter-approved, tax-cutting initiative,
the initiative sponsor referred to the judge as “one guy with a robe on, but he might
as well be wearing a crown if he’s going to act like a king.”  David Postman, I-695
Ruling Fuels Debate over Role of Courts, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000, at B1.
185 See  Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy , 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1584 (1990).
186 See id.  at 1585.
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government and quite another to protect the people from
themselves.”187
IV
ATTEMPTS TO FIX THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
The problems related to financial and special-interest capture
of the ballot initiative system are not new.  Allen Eaton’s 1912
book on the “Oregon System” should make that apparent.188
The most effective method for limiting financial influence on the
initiative system—banning the payment of signature gatherers—
has been foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court.189  However,
there have been other attempts and proposals.  This section ex-
amines alternative solutions and discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of these alternate methods that attempt to give the
ballot initiative back to the people.
A. Oregon’s Attempts
1. Armatta v. Kitzhaber and the Oregon Constitution
In Armatta v. Kitzhaber ,190 the Oregon Supreme Court redis-
covered article XVII, section 1 of the state constitution, which
requires that “two or more amendments” be proposed “sepa-
rately” to the voters.191  The Armatta  court “found that Measure
40192 made multiple ‘substantive’ changes to the constitution that
were not ‘closely related.’”193  The court determined that the ini-
tiative’s defects were incurable and the separate-vote require-
ment demanded that the entire initiative be struck down.194  The
court’s application of article XVII, section 1, in what has become
known as the Armatta rule, has significantly impacted the Ore-
187 Id.
188 See supra  text accompanying notes 1 and 111.
189 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
190 Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998).
191 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1220.
192 Measure 40 was a ballot initiative intended to “preserve and protect crime
victims’ rights to justice and due process and to ensure the prosecution and convic-
tion of persons who have committed criminal acts.”  Preamble, Ballot Measure 40
(1996) (boldface in original omitted).  For more information about Measure 40 and
the Armatta  decision that struck it down, see generally Philip Bentley, Note,
Armatta v. Kitzhaber: A New Test Safeguarding the Oregon Constitution from
Amendment by Initiative , 78 OR. L. REV. 1139 (1999).
193 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1220.
194 Armatta , 327 Or. at 284, 959 P.2d at 68; Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1220.
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gon initiative system.195  Following Armatta , several initiatives
were struck down by the separate-vote requirement.196  If the
court continues to follow Armatta , most constitutional initiatives
seeking to change the Oregon constitution will likely fail.197
While the Armatta  rule may not be effective in the long run as
a test to preserve representative government, it is the course the
Oregon Supreme Court has chosen.198  As a result, Oregon’s
Constitution has become more stable.199  Meanwhile, the statu-
tory initiative remains available to those seeking to change the
law.  While the Armatta  rule may help protect the Oregon Con-
stitution, it does not eliminate the potential for corruption or
abuse of the initiative system.
2. The Initiative Integrity Act: Circulators as Employees
In response to perceived corruption and abuse of the initiative
system, the Voter Education Project (VEP), a union-backed
195 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1222.
196 Id.  at 1220.
197 Id.  at 1224.  Proponents of a republican form of government, like former Ore-
gon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, will not be upset to see such a change.
Justice Linde has long argued that the initiative process should be governed by the
decision in Kadderly v. City of Portland , 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903).  Hans A.
Linde, State Courts and Republican Government , 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 951, 962
(2001); see  David B. Frohnmayer & Hans A. Linde, Appendix, State Court Respon-
sibility for Maintaining “Republican Government”:  An Amicus Curiae Brief , 39 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 1487, 1491-1500 (2003).  The Kadderly opinion allowed voters to
share in the state’s legislative power—by initiatives and by referenda—only as long
as the representative legislature retains the power to change, repeal, or reenact laws.
Linde, supra , at 963.  This means that ordinary laws may not be put beyond legisla-
tive reach even if they are placed in the state’s constitution or other special obstacles
are put in place to prevent later legislative action. Id.
198 Linde, supra  note 197, at 969-70.  Linde noted that the recent trend of “invali-
dating initiative amendments for formal defects” is:
often less pertinent to the real problem, and . . . less useful in the long run
than the test of preserving representative government.  Yet, the recent de-
cisions suggest that courts no longer believe that overturning an initiated
law outrages most voters. . . . So far, negation or avoidance may have
seemed the courts’ most convenient and politically safe course.
Id.
199 See  Ashbel S. Green, Ruling Puts Oregon’s Initiatives to the Test , OREGONIAN
(Portland), July 9, 2001, at A1 (noting that election law experts agree that the
Armatta  decision restricts Oregonians’ ability to alter the state constitution).  In his
Comment, Cody Hoesly recognizes the importance of a stable constitution.  “A sta-
ble constitution exposits greater principles of government, leaving details to statutes
and future interpretation, while an unstable constitution requires frequent amend-
ment because its excessive detail does not allow for future technological or societal
change.”  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1224.
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watchdog organization, was formed in 2001.200  The VEP has
since been operating with the dual goals of identifying signature
fraud and promoting voter education.201  VEP staff members go
out to the streets—“directly onto the turf of the signature gath-
erer”—asking voters to “think before you ink.”202  VEP staff
“hand out fliers, talk with people to make sure they understand
what they are signing, and even videotape signature gatherers
where they suspect fraud or deception.”203  These efforts have
resulted in the conviction of signature gatherers who admitted
using fraudulent techniques to increase signature totals.204  Ulti-
mately, VEP efforts were largely responsible for bringing down
Bill Sizemore for actions205 described in the following account by
Willamette Week :
If you were a wealthy political conservative with, say,
$50,000, “Dollar Bill” could essentially sell you 50,000 petition
signatures for your pet cause.  Not only that, he could juggle
your donation around between various accounts and organiza-
tions until, when it came time to report the campaign’s fi-
nances, that $50,000 no longer had your name on it.206
Sizemore considered his actions to be shrewd bookkeeping,
but in a 2002 lawsuit brought by Oregon’s largest teacher’s
union, the courts determined that these same actions were, in
fact, “racketeering” and “money laundering.”207  Oregon Tax-
payers United, Sizemore’s organization, was held liable for plac-
ing two measures on the ballot with falsified signatures and
illegal campaign contributions.208  The courts, who later imposed
personal liability on Sizemore, accordingly ordered Oregon Tax-
payers United to pay $2.5 million to defray the opponent’s cost
of fighting the measures.209
Also in 2002, Oregonians reacted to increased perceptions of
faults in the initiative process by passing Measure 26, known as




204 Id.  at 95-96.
205 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1216 n.201.
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the Initiative Integrity Act by a three-to-one margin.210  Measure
26 requires that petition circulators be paid as employees rather
than on a per-signature basis.211  The overwhelming public sup-
port for this measure is largely credited as backlash from the rev-
elations that Bill Sizemore’s groups engaged in voter fraud.212
Not surprisingly, Measure 26 was challenged in court.213  In
Prete v. Bradbury , the court upheld Measure 26, stating that the
“limited burdens imposed by Measure 26 are far outweighed by
[the] need to protect the integrity of the electoral process and to
restore the public’s confidence in its government.”214
While the aims of Measure 26 are admirable, its actual benefits
are debatable.  If anyone could be expected to benefit from Mea-
sure 26, it would surely be the signature gatherers who are now
being paid as employees.  However, an interpretation by the Or-
egon Secretary of State indicates that Measure 26 still allows for
the payment of an hourly wage or salary, minimum signature re-
quirements, the termination of circulators who do not meet pro-
ductivity requirements, and the paying of discretionary bonuses
based on reliability, longevity and productivity.215  Bill Sizemore
does not believe that Measure 26 will have its desired impact and
argues that signature gatherers will still “have the same motiva-
tion they [had before Measure 26]—the same motivation to work
hard, or if they are unscrupulous or lacking in character, the
210 The Initiative Integrity Act was passed as Measure 26 in 2002.  The measure
passed 921,606 to 301,415. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra  note 98, at 302.
211 Measure 26 added the following into the Oregon Constitution:  “It shall be
unlawful to pay or receive money or other thing of value based on the number of
signatures obtained on an initiative or referendum petition.  Nothing herein prohib-
its payment for signature gathering which is not based, either directly or indirectly,
on the number of signatures obtained.” OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1b.
212 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1216.
213 Id.
214 Prete v. Bradbury, No. 03-6357-AA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28738, at *39 (D.
Or. Feb. 18, 2004), aff’d , 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006).  Oregon Secretary of State Bill
Bradbury celebrated the decision, stating that “[t]his decision strongly supports Ore-
gon voters’ judgment that we need to restore public confidence in our initiative and
referendum system, and protect elections against fraud.”  Press Release, Oregon
Secretary of State, Ban on Pay-Per-Signature Upheld (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.
sos.state.or.us/executive/pressrel/021204.htm (last visited June 11, 2006).  Oregon
Attorney General Hardy Myers joined Bradbury in support of the ruling, noting that
the ruling “affirmed the common-sense proposition that regulations aimed at reduc-
ing petition-circulation fraud are not unconstitutional.” Id.  Myers also said that
Measure 26 and the Secretary of State’s rules implementing it were “narrowly tai-
lored to serve the state’s important interests in protecting the integrity of the initia-
tive and referendum process.” Id.
215 OR. ADMIN. R. 165-014-0260 (2006).
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same motivation to cheat.”216
Furthermore, while Measure 26 may ultimately reduce the
number of initiatives on the ballot, those lost will not be from
well-funded special interests.  The measures that fall short will be
from grassroots organizations that are unable to afford the in-
creased costs of paying signature gatherers as employees.217  For
Oregonians in Action,218 Measure 26 simply made it worthwhile
to gather signatures by direct mail.219
Direct-mail signature gathering has generally been eschewed
for “sidewalk” signature gatherers because of cost concerns.220
While acquiring signatures by direct mail is much more expensive
than paying petition circulators, direct mail signatures are more
likely to be valid.221  Thus, from an integrity standpoint, gather-
ing signatures by direct mail is preferable.  If our only concern
was public support for a measure, direct mail would help solve
this problem.  Lowenstein and Stern note that with direct mail
signature gathering, “[s]omething relevant is measured, namely,
the willingness of large numbers of individuals to figure out how
to complete the petition properly and return it.”222  Generally,
direct mail recipients are not likely to sign and return the peti-
tions unless they have some interest in seeing the issue on the
ballot.223  Unfortunately, because of its expense, direct mail still
216 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1217 (alteration in original).
217 See id.
218 Oregonians in Action is an Oregon-based property rights group that spon-
sored Measures 7 and 37, which were property compensation measures. See  Aoki,
Briscoe & Hovland, supra  note 175, at 284-87 (examining the rise of Oregonians in
Action’s influence in Oregon through the use of the initiative process).
219 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1226.
220 Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 12, at 205. The emergence of circulating initia-
tive petitions by direct mail “is generally attributed to a California tax reduction
initiative sponsored by Howard Jarvis in 1979. . . .” Id.  At that time, observers
expected direct-mail usage to “mushroom,” and one state official claimed it would
be “crazy not to go the computer-letter route.  It’s so easy.” Id.  These predictions
were based on the fact that in addition to receiving over 800,000 signatures, Jarvis
also received enough financial contributions to pay for the mailing. Id.  However,
the direct-mail boom never arrived because future campaigns did not receive the
same type of response as Jarvis’s tax initiative. Id.  at 205-06.
221 See  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1226-27.  Direct-mail “signature validity rates are
closer to 90%, far better than the usual 70% that teams of sidewalk signature gather-
ers achieve.” Id.  at 1227.
222 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 208.
223 Id.  Lowenstein and Stern note that it is more difficult to determine whether
the use of volunteer circulators is superior to direct mail.  Using volunteer circula-
tors does a better job of measuring depth of support as compared to breadth. Id.  In
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primarily benefits well-funded initiative proponents.224
While one consequence of Measure 26 may be an increase in
the use of direct mail, ultimately the effectiveness of Measure 26
will only be known over time.  However, perhaps the most valua-
ble consequence of the measure was the court’s recognition that
the state “need[s] to protect the integrity of the electoral process
and to restore the public’s confidence in its government.”225
3. Property Rights v. Political Speech
The Oregon Supreme Court has also limited the locations
where signature gatherers may operate.  In Stranahan v. Fred
Meyer , Inc. , Fred Meyer had a signature gatherer arrested for
refusing to leave the store’s sidewalk where she was gathering
initiative petition signatures.226  In the signature gatherer’s action
for false arrest, the store asserted a defense of its right to exclude
as a private property owner.227  The court concluded that a per-
son soliciting signatures for initiative petitions may not gather
signatures on certain private property over the owner’s objec-
tion.228  The Stranahan  decision overruled the court’s previous
interpretation of article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution
in Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen , which limited a property owner’s abil-
ity to exclude signature gatherers from common areas.229
These Oregon court rulings have approved limitations on the
initiative process.  The impact has been notable, especially that of
Armatta , but the initiative process in Oregon is still in dire need
of reform.  Moreover, Oregon’s initiative system is not the only
one in the country in need of improvement.  The next section
examines the strengths and weaknesses of reform attempts im-
plemented in other initiative states.
contrast, direct mail is an excellent tool to measure breadth of support, but only
indicates depth if numerous financial contributions are included as well.  Id.
224 See id.  at 208-09.  Under the current line of Supreme Court decisions that reg-
ulate signature gathering, including Meyer v. Grant , direct mail may be the best way
to preserve integrity and accurately measure popularity.
225 Prete v. Bradbury, No. 03-6357-AA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28738, at *39 (D.
Or. Feb. 18, 2004), aff’d , 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006).
226 Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 41-42, 11 P.3d 228, 230 (2000).
227 See id.
228 Id.  at 65-66, 11 P.3d at 243; see also  Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution:  A
Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation , 79 OR. L. REV. 793, 861-63
(2000) (providing a more in-depth analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of this issue).
229 Id.  Petitioners do not enjoy this right under the U.S. Constitution, either. See
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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B. Initiative Reform in Other States
1. Increased Signature Thresholds
Several states with the initiative system have experimented
with a variety of reforms.  However, unlike most of Oregon’s at-
tempts, many of these reforms come from legislatures and take
the form of limits that make it more difficult to get an initiative
qualified for the ballot.  The most frequently used reform at-
tempt is to raise the required number of signatures necessary to
qualify an initiative for the ballot.230
Currently, states vary in the percentage of voter signatures
they require for qualification.231  The spectrum ranges from
North Dakota, which requires 2% of the total population to sign,
to Wyoming, which requires signatures totaling 15% of the votes
cast in the previous gubernatorial election.232  While Wyoming
has the highest percentage requirement, California leads the way
in total signatures needed by requiring signatures totaling 5% of
the votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election,233 which
would currently be 373,816 signatures.234
The use of professional signature gatherers creates a situation
where an increased signature threshold equates to raising the
cost of ballot access.235  This increased cost only furthers the
monetary influence over the initiative process, deterring grass-
roots campaigns without a similar impact on well-funded interest
groups.236  The current scarcity of genuine grassroots efforts is a
reflection that ballot qualification is already difficult enough for
underfunded groups and that the added burden of increased sig-
nature thresholds may all but eliminate the grassroots
initiative.237
230 Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1230.
231 RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING:  GOVERNING
THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES app. at 152 (2004).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 California Secretary of State, Elections & Voter Information:  How to Qualify
an Initiative, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_h.htm (last visited June 15,
2006).  Oregon requires 6% of the votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election,
which is generally considered reasonable. BRAUNSTEIN, supra  note 231, app. at 152.
235 See  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1231.
236 Id. at 1230-31.
237 See id.
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2. Time Constraints
Several states have also limited the time in which petitioners
may gather signatures to qualify for the ballot.238  Petitioners in
seventy-five percent of the initiative states are given at least a
year to gather signatures for an initiative, but the time limit still
varies from ninety days in Oklahoma and 150 days in California
to one year in Montana, two years in Oregon, and even four
years in Florida.239  Again, the problem with this limitation is
that it raises the costs for qualifying an initiative, thereby exclud-
ing grassroots campaigns.240  In states with a short time limit, di-
rect democracy firms simply charge more for a guarantee that an
initiative will be on the ballot.241  The majority of observers have
actually recommended eliminating time constraints on signature
gathering, viewing them as an unnecessary hurdle for volunteer
signature drives.242
3. Geographic Distribution Requirements
Yet another common limitation—imposed in half of the initia-
tive states—is to have signatures meet a geographical distribu-
tion requirement.243  The goal of this limitation is to force
petitioners to obtain signatures beyond just heavily populated ur-
ban areas.244  It is notable that geographic distribution require-
ments are not used in any of the states that most frequently use
the initiative (Oregon, California, Arizona, Colorado, and Wash-
ington).245  This should not be too surprising as these require-
ments generally make initiative qualification more costly and
onerous.246  In 1996, the Oregon state legislature placed a refer-
endum on the ballot that would have imposed a geographic re-
quirement; however, it failed with only forty-four percent of the
electorate’s support.247
Like the other alternatives discussed in this section, geographic
238 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 45; Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1231.
239 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 45.
240 See  Hoesly, supra  note 34, at 1230.
241 See id.  at 1231.
242 Id.




247 Harry Esteve, Initiative System Resistant to Change , OREGONIAN (Portland),
May 19, 2000, at D1.
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distribution requirements simply raise the cost of ballot access
without adequately resolving the concerns they are purported to
address.  For those with vast financial resources, the changes
make little difference.  The groups that are hindered most by
these restrictions are those with limited funds, even those with
popular support.
C. Plausible Alternatives
The attempts at reform in Oregon and the other initiative
states have not proved to be viable methods for returning the
initiative to the people as William U’Ren intended.  As this Com-
ment has illustrated, concerns about the ballot initiative system
are not new.248  Suggestions for fixing the system have existed
just as long.
1. Proactive Signatures and Registration Officials
One early suggestion was to require that petitions be left with
and signed in the presence of county registration officials.249  This
proposal aimed to reduce fraud and to ensure that initiatives
reaching the ballot actually addressed voter concerns.250  As one
contemporary account stated:
Everyone knows that under the present system petitions do
not express real opinion.  They are signed for a variety of rea-
sons, among which are desire to be rid of the solicitor or to
help him earn a day’s wages, and the natural tendency to do
that which is requested provided it costs nothing.  Petitions
signed voluntarily by persons who would take the trouble to
go to the registration clerk . . . would be a real call from the
people for initiating or referring any measure.251
Professor Ellis has suggested that if such a system were imple-
mented, petitions could also be made available at public loca-
tions such as libraries, fire stations, and post offices.252  Under
this scenario, “[i]nitiative sponsors could still spend unlimited
amounts of money to hire solicitors who would explain the mea-
sure to interested citizens, distribute relevant literature, and urge
248 See supra  text accompanying notes 1, 12, 92.
249 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 94.
250 Id.
251 Id. ; BARNETT, supra  note 92, at 75 (quoting EUGENE REGISTER, Dec. 18, 1913,
at 4).
252 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 94.
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citizens to sign.”253  Voters who had learned about a measure and
were interested in supporting it would then be able to seek out a
designated public location to sign the petition.254  Certainly those
with financial resources would still have an advantage, but it
would be reduced.255  However, measures that “tap into genuine
citizen grievances or concerns” may be more likely to reach the
ballot, regardless of financial backing.256
Professor Ellis also recognized that in order for such a system
to be viable, a significant reduction in signature thresholds would
be required.257  Under such a program, “proponents of popular
or controversial issues would find qualification substantially eas-
ier,” and “those pushing issues about which people cared little
would find the process much more onerous.”258  In turn, the col-
lection of signatures would actually demonstrate the “breadth
and depth of public support.”259
In recognizing the potential of a registration-official system,
Professor Ellis also recognized that the reality is that such a pro-
posal is unlikely to be adopted.260  The registration official sys-
tem was not adopted when the Eugene Register  lobbied for it in
1913, and little indicates that the public would be receptive to it
today.261  Professor Ellis did, however, offer what he termed a
“more modest but probably more realistic proposal” as well.262
He proposed pressing state officials to increase the monitoring of
the signature gathering, which would help preserve some legiti-
macy in the system.263
In Oregon, a private group took the initiative to begin moni-
toring the signature gathering phase of the initiative process.
The Voter Education Project offers an example of the corruption
and fraud that can be exposed and eliminated from signature
gathering.264  Because VEP is union-backed, however, the organ-
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.  at 94-95.




260 See id.  (noting that a registration official system is not that realistic).
261 Id. at 94-95.
262 Id.  at 95.
263 Id. Ellis has observed that “[e]lections officials would not dream of leaving
polling places unattended, yet signature gathering is routinely conducted without
any observers monitoring the process.” Id.
264 Id.
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ization has been subject to partisan accusations.265  Political lean-
ings aside, it is impossible to deny that the VEP did catch
signature gatherers attempting to defraud the system.266  One
signature gatherer estimated that the number of valid signatures
on his petitions could have been in the single digits.267  Another
convicted signature gatherer believed valid signatures comprised
approximately half of his petition sheets.268  Additionally, the
VEP’s efforts helped prevent two initiatives with numerous
fraudulent signatures from making it on the ballot.269  Further-
more, the VEP’s efforts can be given some credit for bringing
down Bill Sizemore, creating the public sentiment that passed
Measure 26 (the Initiative Integrity Act), and providing evidence
that helped defeat the Measure 26 court challenge.270
However, while the VEP’s efforts should be commended, the
state government should be responsible for providing such a
monitoring system.  It is encouraging that the VEP generated
publicity and evidence that helped convince the Secretary of
State’s office to create a position responsible for monitoring the
signature gathering process.271  Also, while increased monitoring
is something that should be incorporated into initiative reform, it
does nothing to ameliorate the fiscal realities of today’s initiative
system.
2. The Volunteer Bonus
Political scientists and initiative scholars have asked, “[w]hat, if
anything, can be done to make it more likely that the measures
that qualify for the ballot resemble issues that ordinary citizens
are most concerned about?”272  One of the few suggestions that
might address this problem is the “volunteer bonus.”273  This pro-
265 Lisa Baker , Voter Education (Eradication) Project:  Is Their Goal Education or
Elimination of Oregon Voters’ Rights? , BRAINSTORM NW, Dec. 2003, at 55, available
at  http://www.brainstormnw.com/archive/dec03_feature.html.
266 Ellis, supra note 8, at 95.
267 Id.
268 Id.  at 95-96.
269 Id.  at 96.
270 See id. ; see also  Prete v. Bradbury, No. 03-6357-AA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28738, at *34-38 (D. Or. Feb. 18, 2004) (finding compelling state interest in Measure
26 because it combats fraud and restores public confidence in the initiative process),
aff’d , 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006).
271 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 96.
272 Id.  at 94.
273 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 221.  For a more in-depth look at the
proposition of the volunteer bonus, see id.  at 220-23.
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posal would require initiative campaigns that pay signature gath-
erers to turn in a larger number of signatures than campaigns
that use volunteers.274
Essentially, there would be a two-tier signature require-
ment.275  Campaigns could gather signatures with both volun-
teers and paid circulators; however, there would be a bonus for
signatures obtained by volunteers.276  The goal of the volunteer
bonus would be to discourage paid signature gathering by giving
“a significant incentive to switch, at least in part, to volun-
teers.”277  Coupling a “volunteer bonus” with a higher number of
required signatures would foster volunteer participation without
curtailing the paid signature-gatherer option.278  Professor Ellis
suggests that implementing such a system would improve ballot
access for volunteer-led efforts, while impeding paid signature
gatherers.279  Unfortunately, however, the volunteer bonus pro-
posal invites several potential problems.
Professor Elizabeth Garrett has argued that the volunteer bo-
nus encourages fraud and abuse of the system.280  The unequal
value of signatures would likely encourage groups to disguise the
origin of signatures and circulator payment in order to qualify for
the ballot with fewer signatures.281  Policing these abuses would
be difficult.282  While direct fraud such as lying about the origin
of signatures may be detectable, some situations would be a
much closer call.  For example, Professor Garrett posed the fol-
lowing dilemma:  “[I]nterest groups relying on volunteers fre-
quently boost morale and encourage participation with parties
and food.  When do such in-kind benefits become so generous
that they serve as compensation?”283
The volunteer bonus raises other concerns as well.  The U.S.
Supreme Court may take issue with a volunteer bonus program.
The essence of such a program is to reward volunteer efforts and
274 See id.  at 221.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.  at 222.
278 Ellis, supra  note 8, at 93-94.
279 Id.
280 See  Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy , 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1845, 1874 (1999).
281 Id.
282 Id.  at 1874-75.
283 Id.  at 1875.
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conversely penalize paid campaigns.284  While less onerous than
banning or criminalizing the payment of signature gatherers en-
tirely, the volunteer bonus proposal may still be viewed as bur-
dening political speech.285  As Professor Garrett noted, any state
implementing a volunteer bonus for signatures will need to show
a compelling state interest for the regulation.286
Additionally, the volunteer bonus may be subject to an equal
protection challenge.287  Lowenstein and Stern have addressed
this concern:
If an equal protection challenge is brought by a proponent
who relies predominantly on paid circulators, the response
would be that the proponent has the same right as others to
recruit volunteer circulators.  Furthermore . . . the volunteer
bonus is supported by the compelling state interest of ration-
ing ballot positions on a basis other than the depth of the pro-
ponent’s pocket.288
Beyond the courtroom, other notable concerns about the vol-
unteer bonus have been raised.  Professor Ellis points out that
while the volunteer bonus may stimulate grassroots involvement,
“it does not address the problem that ‘signatures, whether gath-
ered by volunteers or paid solicitors, are simply not meaningful
gauges of public discontent or even interest.’”289  Also, upon in-




287 Ellis, supra note 8, at 94.  “Nebraska considered such a two-tiered plan in
1995, but the proposal was eventually defeated amidst concerns that the volunteer’s
bonus might violate equal protection guarantees and prove difficult to administer
and enforce.” Id.
288 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 223.  Lowenstein and Stern also argue
that:
[t]he unequal weighting of signatures might be analogized to unequal
weighting of votes, which is not permitted under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  But a signature on a petition is not like a vote, for purposes of evalu-
ating “weighting.”  Votes are competitive, either among candidates or
among positions (yes or no) on propositions.  Increasing the “weight” of
A’s vote harms B , who may take a position opposed to A’s.  In contrast,
petition signing is additive.  If B  signs a petition section circulated by a
professional circulator in the hope of qualifying a measure for the ballot,
B’s goals are furthered, not hindered, if A’s signature for the same mea-
sure on a section circulated by a volunteer is multiplied.   Furthermore, B
retains the option of signing a volunteer section and thereby multiplying
the effect of B’s own signature.
Id.  (footnote omitted).
289 Ellis, supra note 8, at 94.
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Stern saw politics as the primary hurdle to contend with, writing
that:
The main drawback of our proposal is neither one of policy
nor of constitutionality, but of politics.  The volunteer bonus
makes the process somewhat more complex than it has been,
and even may appear gimmicky at first hearing.  The Colorado
ban was much more straightforward, and in that sense it was
preferable.  The volunteer bonus system, at the cost of greater
complexity, introduces an element of flexibility that may be
desirable.  At any rate, the straightforward approach is ruled
out for now.  Those interested in the well-being of our
processes of direct democracy will need to be open to innova-
tive approaches, whether to ours or to others that may be put
forward.290
Ultimately, I can only come to the same conclusion as Lowen-
stein and Stern.  When the Supreme Court held Colorado’s ban
on the payment of signature gatherers unconstitutional in
Meyer ,291 it was a blow to the legitimacy of the initiative process.
The Court took away a major tool from the states to regulate
their democratic institutions, and in the cases that followed
Meyer , largely shot down any attempt to fix the initiative pro-
cess.292  Some critics have abandoned hope that the Court will
have a “change of heart.”293  Recent decisions, however, may in-
dicate a small glimmer of hope that the Court will return control
of the initiative back to the states.
290 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 223.
291 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988).
292 See , e.g. , Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 205
(1999) (holding that some of Colorado’s ballot access controls unjustifiably inhibited
the circulation of ballot-initiative petitions).  Also, prior to Meyer , the U.S. Supreme
Court had ruled that a restriction limiting political contributions to a ballot-measure
campaign violated the First Amendment.  Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for
Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981) (“Whatever may be the
state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and limiting contributions to or
expenditures of a candidate or a candidate’s committees there is no significant state
or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure.”).
293 See  Ellis, supra note 8, at 96.  Ellis has put his faith in the voters and noted
that:
Absent a judicial change of heart or dramatic legislative action (both very
unlikely), the main responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the initiative
process will rest with individual citizens, who should refuse to sign an initia-
tive petition until they have read the proposed bill carefully and thought
about it for a long while.
Id.
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3. Revisiting Meyer v. Grant
The first U.S. Supreme Court decision discussed in this Com-
ment was Buckley v. Valeo .294  The current jurisprudence im-
pacting the initiative would not be the same without the
foundation provided by Buckley .  However, this Comment will
not address the possibility of Buckley v. Valeo being over-
turned,295 but will instead focus on the implications of revisiting
Meyer v. Grant .
When the Meyer decision was handed down, Lowenstein and
Stern saw the decision for what it was and crafted a critique that
the Court should consider:
The world will little note nor long remember Meyer v.
Grant .  Yet, even a minor decision of the United States Su-
preme Court has significant consequences.  In Meyer , which
struck down a Colorado law banning the use of paid circula-
tors for the qualification of initiatives for the ballot, these con-
sequences included the apparent removal from consideration
by the states of a salutary and timely device for the reform of
the initiative process. . . . The Colorado statute did not pro-
hibit any form of speech, and the Court’s decision privileged
not communication, but the access to the ballot of those with
financial resources, to the detriment of those without such
resources.296
Lowenstein and Stern also pointed to several other faults in
the Meyer  decision.297  The remainder of this section will focus
on the argument that Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, failed
to recognize the states’ interest in safeguarding the initiative pro-
cess by ensuring significant popular support for any measure
making the ballot.
In Meyer , the Court addressed the question of whether a state
could prohibit proponents from paying individuals to gather sig-
natures for initiative petitions.298  Lowenstein and Stern contend
“that given the plain need to ration the limited number of ballot
positions, the more pertinent question is whether the state may
294 For a discussion and evaluation of Buckley , see supra  notes 56-62 and accom-
panying text.
295 As former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan said, “Buckley v.
Valeo , the two-decades-old decision that gave limited First Amendment protection
to the outlay of political money, has become the great white whale of constitutional
law:  the more elusive its demise becomes, the greater the intellectual exertion ex-
pended in its pursuit.”  Sullivan, supra  note 56, at 311 (footnote omitted).
296 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 175-76 (footnote omitted).
297 See generally id.  (criticizing the Meyer  decision).
298 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 416 (1988).
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choose a system in which the requisite level of support must be
demonstrated by the willingness of volunteers to devote time and
effort to circulate petitions.”299
The Meyer  Court felt public sentiment could be measured by
the number of voters willing to sign the petition.300  Numerous
studies, however, have shown that the number of signatures gath-
ered proves very little about the voter’s support for a measure.301
Of course, it may be easier to get signatures for a popular mea-
sure, but popularity pales in comparison to the importance of the
number of potential signers.302  Lowenstein and Stern assert that
as a result, “the true hurdle for qualifying measures for the ballot
is not having a proposal that people want to sign but inducing
enough people to go out and circulate the petitions.”303  Amaz-
ingly, Justice Stevens emphasized the notion that petition circula-
tion is hard work and even recognized the difficulty in recruiting
volunteer signature gatherers.304  However, he failed to recog-
nize the connection between the willingness of volunteers and
public support.305
Admittedly, volunteer circulators do not necessarily guarantee
broad popular support.306  A measure qualified wholly by volun-
teer circulators, however, demonstrates that there are at least a
fair number of individuals who are willing to make a considera-
ble personal sacrifice for the cause.307  In contrast, a measure that
is qualified by paid circulators only demonstrates that someone
was willing to pay for it.308  The financial cost of qualifying an
initiative today is not cost prohibitive for well-financed special
interests or corporations.  Lowenstein and Stern believe that “if
supporters can hire enough circulators, . . . the measure can qual-
ify, even though virtually no voters have any affirmative desire to
299 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 186-87.
300 See Meyer , 486 U.S. at 425-26.
301 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 213-14.
302 Id.  at 203.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See id. (explaining that “the true hurdle for qualifying measures for the ballot
is not having a proposal that people want to sign but inducing enough people to go
out and circulate the petitions” and noting that hiring circulators is much easier than
recruiting volunteers).
306 This is because a small group of extremely dedicated volunteers may be able to
qualify a measure. Id.  at 203-04.
307 Id. at 203.
308 Id.  at 204.
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have it enacted into law.”309
The potential for abuse of such a system is too great.  The ex-
ample of Bill Sizemore’s group, Oregon Taxpayers United, dic-
tating the political agenda in Oregon exemplifies how William
U’Ren’s vision of the initiative as a tool for the people has been
turned inside out—wealthy interests control the process, not the
“people.”310  The professional initiative industry has eliminated
the system’s ability to filter ballot propositions in a manner con-
sistent with the purposes of the system.311
Colorado, like Oregon, had found a simple and effective way
to repair the system.  In Meyer , however, the Court took away
the states’ ability to ban the payment of signature gatherers, as-
serting that signatures sufficiently demonstrate support for a
measure.312  We have seen that this is simply not true.313
Before Meyer  was decided, Coloradoans used the initiative
with great frequency.314  In fact, the district court in Meyer  had
found that Colorado had one of the heaviest usage rates of the
initiative in the United States and had more initiatives qualify for
the ballot than in most states that permitted circulator pay-
ment.315  Presented with this information, the Meyer Court’s re-
sponse was to note “that even more petitions would have been
successful if paid circulators had been available . . . .”316
The Court’s response ignores the fact that the purpose of the
signature requirement is to eliminate proposed initiatives that
lack a certain level of popular support.317  If the objective was to
qualify the largest possible number of initiatives, states could
simply remove the signature requirement.318  As was noted
above, no state has chosen to go this route because without a
signature threshold, it is nearly certain that voters would be over-
whelmed with trivial and idiosyncratic measures.319
Instead, prior to Meyer v. Grant , states regulated their initia-
309 Id.
310 See supra  notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
311 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 204-05.
312 See  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1988); Lowenstein & Stern, supra
note 12, at 205.
313 See supra  text accompanying notes 300-09.
314 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 218.
315 Id. ; see Meyer , 486 U.S. at 419 n.3.
316 Meyer , 486 U.S. at 419 n.3.
317 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 219.
318 Id.  at 218-19.
319 See supra  text accompanying notes 14-15; Ellis, supra  note 8, at 44.
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tive systems in a way to ensure ballot initiatives had the neces-
sary popularity to warrant statewide consideration.320  When
Meyer was decided, dissatisfaction with the financial capture of
the initiative qualification process was rising.321  That same dis-
enchantment exists today, and Meyer  simply barred the most
straightforward remedy the states had.322
In the years following Meyer,  the Court and the public have
become more comfortable with campaign finance reform.323  In
fact, Meyer  was decided by the Supreme Court at a time when
such laws were viewed as impinging too greatly on First Amend-
ment rights.324  But now, Professor Richard Hasen argues that
several cases that precluded states from limiting contributions or
expenditures to initiative campaigns are ripe for reexamination
under the Supreme Court’s recent deference to campaign finance
regulation.325
Professor Hasen points to McConnell v. FEC ,326 Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC ,327 FEC v. Colorado Republi-
can Federal Campaign Committee ,328 and FEC v. Beaumont329 as
the “New Deference Quartet” (NDQ).330  He argues that these
cases may signal that the Court is more willing to recognize that
ballot measure limits are an important tool to limit corruption
and preserve voter confidence.331  He further states that while
the NDQ cases “did not concern ballot measures . . . their analy-
ses of campaign finance laws in the context of candidate  elections
[could] potentially open up the door to new regulations in the
ballot measure  context.”332
One solution to the current dilemma over state regulation of
the initiative system would be to challenge Meyer .  If Professor
Hasen is correct and the Supreme Court would be more recep-
tive to a challenge, Oregon, with its history of national leadership
320 See supra  Part IV.B.
321 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 219.
322 Id.
323 Hasen, supra note 57, at 885-86.
324 Id.  at 886.
325 Id.  For a more detailed examination of the Court’s shift in attitude toward
campaign finance reform, see generally id.
326 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
327 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
328 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
329 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
330 Hasen, supra  note 57, at 886.
331 Id.  at 886-87.
332 Id.  at 886.
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in the initiative process, would be the perfect state to reenact a
ban on the payment of signature gatherers.333  Challenging
Meyer  based on Lowenstein and Stern’s arguments could return
the power to regulate the initiative system back to the states.  If
Meyer  was overturned and the states had the power to regulate
the initiative, there is a possibility that the states could return the
initiative back to the people as William U’Ren and his followers
intended.
V
BEYOND THE SIGNATURE THRESHOLD
Meyer  should be overturned; however, if no state challenges it
or if the Supreme Court holds its ground, we must look at an
alternate solution.  Currently, the signature threshold require-
ment only operates to prevent those without an abundance of
financial resources from getting on the ballot.  Furthermore, state
attempts to enact a useful signature threshold have either been
struck down by the Court, rendered ultimately ineffective, or
both.
If the Court will not revisit Meyer , the time has come to aban-
don the signature threshold.  Such a suggestion has been put for-
ward before by observers who feel the system is beyond repair
and are willing to abandon hope of eliminating financial influ-
ence on the initiative system.334  This so-called “cynic’s choice”
suggests that groups seeking to gain access to the ballot through
the initiative should simply pay a very substantial filing fee.335
Such a system would save the state the expense of verifying sig-
natures and free up much needed resources for other pro-
grams.336  While this system would do little for grassroots groups,
333 While Oregon may be a natural leader in the initiative process, any attempt at
banning paid signature gatherers may be unconstitutional under Oregon’s free ex-
pression clause. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“No law shall be passed restraining the
free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on
any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this
right.”). See generally  Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism , 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
493 (1996) (discussing how Oregon courts have interpreted free expression to be
broader under the Oregon constitution than their federal counterparts have inter-
preted freedom of expression under federal law).
334 See  Ellis, supra note 8, at 93.
335 DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra  note 118, at 102-04; Ellis, supra  note 8, at 93; Low-
enstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 200 n.116 (suggesting a filing fee ranging from
$400,000 to $700,000).
336 Ellis, supra note 8, at 93.
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it would at least wash away the pretense that the system is in
place to help them.337
The “cynic’s choice” in itself is more favorable than our cur-
rent system;338 however, it could be drastically improved with a
little vision.  The cynics would throw out the signature threshold
and replace it with a large filing fee.  However, that plan lacks
what the signature threshold was intended to produce:  a mea-
sure that has enough popular support to warrant ballot
qualification.339
A. The Initiative Primary
The creation of a new system for qualifying an initiative that
would replace the signature threshold should be guided by the
notion that “it can be both too hard and too easy to qualify an
initiative.”340  The system needs to set a high enough bar to pre-
vent initiatives from being filed on a whim and low enough so as
to allow “committed citizens with genuine, widely shared griev-
ances” to bring “their issue directly before the people.”341
Such a system could be created by replacing the signature
threshold with a filing fee and an “initiative primary.”  The filing
fee would only differ from the “cynic’s choice” in amount.  The
fee should be set at an amount high enough to deter pure whims
and low enough that a sizeable yet underfunded group of people
could afford it.  Once petitioners pay the filing fee and obtain a
ballot title and summary, the proposal would be placed on a pri-
mary initiative ballot.342
The initiative primary could resemble a traditional candidate
primary election and may even accompany the traditional ballot.
Voters would then choose the initiatives that propose changes
that are important to them.  A minimum percentage of votes
would be required to make the final ballot.  This percentage
should be based on registered voters so that it would require at
least a certain level of turnout and commitment from the entire
electorate.  Again, the number should be high enough to main-
tain the initiative process’s integrity and yet low enough to only
337 See id.
338 See Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 199-200 & n.116.
339 Ellis, supra note 8, at 44.
340 Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 220; see  Ellis, supra note 8, at 44.
341 Ellis, supra note 8, at 44.
342 For a discussion on how to attain a ballot title and summary in Oregon, see
supra  text accompanying notes 39-45.
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allow those measures truly supported by citizens.  Initiatives
meeting the established threshold would then appear on election
ballots as they currently do.  The initiative primary would assist
states in returning integrity to the initiative process and should
bolster voter confidence.
The benefits of an initiative primary would be manifold.  From
a control standpoint, the states would be able to establish limits
that appropriately limit the number of initiatives on the ballot.
From a fraud standpoint, signatures would be replaced by more-
reliable votes.  As for popular support of the electorate, the initi-
ative primary combined with a vote requirement will ensure that
measures on the final ballot enjoy a breadth of support through-
out the voting population.  While the filing fee could be seen as a
way of simply selling legislation, this Comment and other articles
have pointed out that the current system is doing just that while
presenting itself under a false pretense of popular public
support.343
As for the current funding disparity among initiative propo-
nents, it would still exist but with a more limited influence.
While well-funded groups would still be able to win the battle of
advertising, that does not always guarantee victory.344  Further-
more, any financial burdens placed on the state government by
an added election step should be offset by the filing fees and
elimination of the signature confirmation stage.
Of course, no system is without faults.  One shortfall of the
initiative primary is that the likely increase in demand for ballot
titles and summaries would result in a proliferation of ballot title
challenges.  From a financial standpoint, filing fees will hopefully
offset this cost.  Beyond cost, there is concern about overwhelm-
ing the Oregon Supreme Court with ballot title challenges.345
This reality may make the creation of a specialty court designed
to deal with ballot title challenges useful to alleviate the added
343 Ellis, supra note 8, at 58-71, 75-77; Lowenstein & Stern, supra  note 12, at 200-
05.
344 Garrett, supra  note 280, at 1847 (noting that scholars of the impact of financial
influence on ballot questions have “uniformly concluded that money plays a large
role in such campaigns, particularly when it is spent to defeat ballot questions”).
345 Oregon law requires ballot title challenges to be heard by the Oregon Su-
preme Court. OR. REV. STAT. § 250.085 (2005).  As a result, the court already
spends much of its time and resources on the ballot title process. ELLIS, supra  note
86, at 149; see also supra  text accompanying notes 153-55 (discussing effect of initia-
tives on the Oregon Supreme Court caseload).
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burdens on the court.346
Another potential critique of the initiative primary is the po-
tential “lag” in democracy.  The notion that the initiative primary
will somehow place a burdensome amount of time between an
initiative being proposed and becoming law is, however,
incorrect.
Such a charge fails to recognize that the time used securing and
confirming signatures would be eliminated because initiatives
would be placed on the initiative primary ballot after securing a
ballot title.  In addition, the time between the initiative primary
and general election may actually be beneficial.
This time gap could allow the legislature to pass laws in reac-
tion to public concerns.  The passage rate of an initiative in the
primary could potentially serve as a strong incentive for state leg-
islators to take action.  Legislative compromise may prevent peti-
tioners from seeing their exact proposal put into law; however,
this concession may be worth avoiding the likely court challenges
of a proposed law that has not been vetted by checks and bal-
ances in the traditional political process.
Additionally, the initiative primary system might deter the
generation or manipulation of initiatives by candidates, political
parties, or other political actors seeking to aid the campaigns of
particular candidates or parties.347  Under the current system,
those seeking to use “crypto-initiatives” are able to calculate the
investment in getting the required signatures for ballot place-
ment.  An unpopular initiative may require a more significant
dedication of resources than proponents are willing to expend for
a chance at making the general election ballot.  In sum, any in-
conveniences created by the initiative primary are outweighed by
the benefits of returning integrity to direct democracy.
CONCLUSION
The time has come to reform Oregon’s initiative system.  The
ballot initiative was first used in Oregon, and the state has taken
a certain pride in the system.  Accordingly, Oregon should also
346 This court would be similar to the Oregon Tax Court.  In 1961, the Oregon
legislature created the Tax Court to encourage uniform application of tax laws state-
wide.  The Tax Court is a special court that has exclusive, statewide jurisdiction to
hear only cases that involve Oregon’s tax laws.  For more information, see Oregon
Tax Courts, http://www.ojd.state.or.us/courts/tax/index.htm (last visited July 29,
2006).
347 Garrett, supra  note 143, at 986.
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be willing to make the tough choices necessary to return the initi-
ative to the people as William U’Ren intended.  The most direct
way to return the system would be to challenge Meyer v. Grant .
Oregon, through the legislature or initiative, could make this
challenge by reenacting the law banning signature gathering.
Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court would be willing to address
the issue again and recognize the states’ interest in regulating
their democratic institutions.  If, however, the Court is not willing
to revisit Meyer,  or the people of Oregon or another state are not
willing to challenge it, the signature threshold should be
discarded.
This Comment has offered one option to replace the current
initiative qualification process.  While the initiative primary may
not be the best answer, a solution must be found in order to re-
store integrity to the initiative process and give back the people’s
check on legislative corruption and inaction.  Without such re-
form, the initiative system creates more problems than it is
worth.  Without reform, the initiative system is just a political
system for sale.  Without reform of the initiative system, state
governments might as well put up a “for sale” sign, charge a mas-
sive filing fee, and take away the facade of popular support.
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